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The smart grid (SG) has been emerging as the next-generation intelligent power
grid system because of its ability to efficiently monitor, predicate, and control energy gener-
ation, transmission, and consumption by analyzing users’ real-time electricity information.
Consider a situation in which the utility company would like to smartly protect against
a power outage. To do so, the company can determine a threshold for a neighborhood.
Whenever the total power usage from the neighborhood exceeds the threshold, some or
all of the households need to reduce their energy consumption to avoid the possibility
of a power outage. This problem is referred to as threshold-based power usage control
(TPUC) in the literature. In order to solve the TPUC problem, the utility company is
required to periodically collect the power usage data of households. However, it has been
well documented that these power usage data can reveal consumers’ daily activities and
violate personal privacy. To avoid the privacy concerns, privacy-preserving power usage
control (P-PUC) protocols are proposed under two strategies: adjustment based on maxi-
mum power usage and adjustment based on individual power usage. These protocols allow
a utility company to manage power consumption effectively and at the same time, pre-
serve the privacy of all involved parties. Furthermore, the practical value of the proposed
protocols is empirically shown through various experiments.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a rapid growth in the use of smart grid technology
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5], which is envisioned as the future’s energy-efficient and self-monitoring power
system. As the smart grid offers tremendous benefits, it has attracted a significant amount
of attention from researchers across academia, industry, and government agencies. Much
work has been done to address various issues and implementation details related to the
deployment of smart grids in various sectors [5, 6, 7]. A lot of telecommunication, power,
and IT companies are already enjoying the benefits of smart grid technology by deploying
it in their daily business operations. Nevertheless, more research needs to be done to
address the various open challenges such as security and privacy issues [8, 9, 10].
This dissertation primarily focuses on the power outage issue in the smart grid
environment. Consider a utility company that self-monitors the power supply to a neigh-
borhood (i.e., uses smart grid technology) by collecting the power usage data of each
household in the neighborhood. When the total power usage from the neighborhood is
extremely high, the physical components in a smart grid could be overloaded, which would
lead to a long-lasting regional power failure (i.e., the power outage of the entire system) and
huge financial losses. Therefore, preventing this kind of power outage by controlling the
power usage of households (especially in an electricity peak demand time) is an important
task since it is beneficial for both the utility company and its customers.
In order to prevent the failure of these physical components, one kind of power usage
control is to dynamically adjust the consumers’ power consumption. For each servicing
neighborhood, the utility company can determine a power usage threshold beyond which
the physical components of a smart grid may work dangerously above their expected
capacities. The threshold can be compared with the total power usage of a neighborhood at
a particular time, which can be computed based on the power usage readings from the smart
meters of individual households. Whenever a neighborhood’s total power usage exceeds its
related threshold, some or all of the households in the neighborhood need to reduce their
energy consumption based on their current usage. To effectively achieve this threshold-
2based power usage control (TPUC), the utility company should first provide consumers
with incentives to participate. Then, the utility company needs to frequently collect and
analyze the power usage data from each household in the participating neighborhood. To
attract participation, the utility company can reduce the rate for participating consumers.
In return, the consumers agree to reduce their power consumption when necessary, i.e.,
household with more power consumption in the neighborhood needs to reduce more of its
energy consumption to bring down the total power usage of the neighborhood when the
total usage exceeds the threshold.
However, existing research [11] has shown that specific types of appliances and
generators can be identified through their signatures exhibited in the electric usage data
(collected from a meter) when the collection frequency is very high (when the collection
period is less than 1 hour) compared to the monthly-based collections. Similar research
[12] also demonstrated that the usage patterns of most major home appliances can be de-
termined by analyzing 15-minute interval aggregate household energy consumption data.
More detailed power consumption information increases the likelihood of discovering con-
sumers’ private information because activities of daily living (ADL) can be inferred (such
as how many people are in the building, when household owners are asleep, etc) from
appliance usage patterns. Therefore, customer privacy might be disclosed to the utility
company through the frequently collected power usage data. Even if the utility company
is allowed to hold customers’ personal information, it may still not want to store or use
these data directly because the company is liable to the negative consequences if the data
are disclosed to a malicious party. If those pieces of sensitive information are disclosed to
adversaries, malicious attacks can be launched more easily. In addition, the threshold set
by the utility company can reveal its operational capacity and its number of customers
in a neighborhood. To preserve a competitive advantage, any information regarding the
threshold values should not be disclosed to the public. Thus, it is beneficial or even nec-
essary to develop a protocol that achieves TPUC without individual households disclosing
their power usage data or the company disclosing its threshold values. This process is
called a privacy-preserving TPUC, denoted as P-PUC.
3Secure protocols to solve the P-PUC problem under different power adjusting strate-
gies are proposed [13, 14]. Those protocols are executed directly between a utility company
and its household customers. However, at least one of the following limitations appears in
those protocols:
• Not very efficient when the threshold values are from a large domain.
• Leak certain intermediate information that can be used to infer knowledge about the
private power usage data of individual households and the threshold values set by
the utility companies.
• Incur heavy computations between the households and the utility company.
To eliminate these problems, a novel P-PUC protocol that allows computations to
be completely outsourced to cloud servers is also considered. Recently, cloud computing has
emerged as an approach that offers cost efficiency and operational flexibility for entities to
outsource their data and computations for on-demand services. Because the power usage
data can be very large in quantity (especially when these data are collected with high
frequency), it is beneficial for a utility company to outsource the data and computations
related to P-PUC protocols to a cloud.
As discussed before, the power usage data and threshold values are sensitive infor-
mation, so these data should not be disclosed to the cloud. Thus, before outsourcing, the
data need to be encrypted, so the cloud would only be storing and processing the encrypted
data. When the data are encrypted with fully homomorphic encryption schemes, the cloud
can perform any arbitrary computations over the encrypted data without ever decrypt-
ing them. Nevertheless, fully homomorphic encryption schemes have yet to be practical
due to their extremely high computational cost. As a result, a multi-server framework to
securely and efficiently implement the proposed protocol is also developed and termed as
outsourceable P-PUC (OP-PUC) [15].
41.1. PROBLEM DEFINITION
This dissertation contains a proposal for P-PUC protocols under both basic setting
and multiple cloud servers setting. Therefore, the basic setting comes first and is followed
by the multi-server setting. Some other overall assumptions appear last.
1.1.1. Basic Setting. Without loss of generality, let A1, . . . , An be n households
from a neighborhood with a1, . . . , an as their power consumption in a specific time interval,
respectively (e.g., 15 minutes). In addition, let t denote the threshold for the neighborhood
that is commonly determined by the utility company C (note that the threshold value
may vary from different neighborhoods), and let a denote the total power usage for the
neighborhood during the same time interval (i.e., a =
∑n
i=1 ai). Whenever a > t, some
or all consumers are required to reduce their power consumption in order to prevent the
possibility of a power outage in the neighborhood. Suppose δi is the reduction in power
consumption for consumer Ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In general, the δi values can be zero∗,
and the actual reduction in power consumption for each Ai depends on either ai (i.e.,
power consumed by Ai during a fixed period) or its current usage (the user might sign an
agreement to reduce the power of devices that appear on a list). This purely depends on
the underlying strategy used.
The literature presents several strategies to prevent a power outage in a smart grid.
Nevertheless, such techniques assume the availability of household power consumption
data to the utility company (or intermediate substation or data concentrator) to perform
diagnostics in order to predict and prevent power outages. In the proposed problem setting,
each user’s power consumption data are treated as his/her private information. Under such
a scenario, the standard schemes are not applicable. Therefore, this dissertation gives two
strategies described below:
• Strategy 1 - Adjustment Based on Maximum Power Usage: Whenever a > t, the
consumer with the maximum power usage is requested to reduce his/her power con-
sumption. After this, if the updated average total power usage a is still greater than
∗Observe that whenever t ≥ a, δi = 0, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
5t, then the above process is repeated in an iterated fashion. In each iteration, the
consumer with the maximum power usage is requested to cut down the power for
some devices that do not affect his/her daily life, such as shutting down the dryer or
washer or adjusting the temperature of the air conditioner.
• Strategy 2 - Adjustment Based on Individual Power Usage: Under this strategy, each
consumer Ai computes the lower bound on the amount of power usage to be reduced
(i.e., δi) locally based on his/her last usage ai. Whenever a > t, Ai computes his/her










Under Strategy 2, after the reductions are made by each consumer, the updated total
power usage a will always be less than t.
It is straightforward to develop TPUC protocols based on the previous two strate-
gies. However, building a P-PUC protocol by taking a user’s privacy into consideration
is a challenging task. Though the two strategies are different, a P-PUC can be formally
defined as follows:
(〈A1, δ1〉, . . . , 〈An, δn〉)← P-PUC(〈A1, a1〉, . . . , 〈An, an〉, 〈C, t〉) (1)
In general, for any given P-PUC protocol, the following requirements need to be satisfied
to preserve the user’s privacy:
• The user’s average power consumption ai should not be revealed to the other con-
sumers or C.
• The threshold t is private to C, and it should not be revealed to the consumers
(t might be used to infer the power capacity of the power plant or other private
knowledge of the neighborhood).
6• The intermediate results, which are different for the above two strategies, should not
be released to either consumers or C (to avoid any inference attacks).
First of all, the input values ai and t are private information of Ai and C, respectively;
therefore, they should be protected from other parties for obvious security reasons. In
addition, under a secure multi-party computation (MPC) framework, a protocol is consid-
ered secure against semi-honest adversaries if the intermediate results seen by a party are
either random or pseudo-random. This is an inherent security property that is required to
prevent any inference attacks. For example, consider the intermediate result a =
∑n
i=1 ai.
For simplicity, let n = 2. Now, revealing the value of a to Ai’s will also reveal one party’s
private input to the other party. This clearly violates the user’s privacy. Therefore, all the
intermediate results must be protected while constructing the secure protocols to satisfy
the security definition of MPC. More details about the security definition adopted in this
dissertation are given in Section 3.2.1.. At the end of the P-PUC protocol, a ≤ t. During
this process, only consumer Ai knows δi (as his/her output), and nothing else is revealed
to C and Ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
1.1.2. Multi-Server Setting. When an outsourcing environment is considered,
the input values a1, . . . , an and t should be hidden from the cloud servers because these
cloud servers cannot be trusted. That is, before outsourcing, these values need to be
either encrypted or secretly shared. In the proposed OP-PUC protocols, an additive secret
sharing scheme is adopted to hide the original values. The proposed OP-PUC protocol
can be formulated as follows:
(〈A1, δ1〉, . . . , 〈An, δn〉)← OP-PUC(〈A1, a1〉, . . . , 〈An, an〉, S1, S2, 〈C, t〉) (2)
According to the above formulation, there are three types of participating entities: n
households, two cloud service providers S1 and S2, and a utility company C. The input for
each household or customer Ai is its average power consumption ai within a specific period
of time, and the input of C is a threshold t. The two cloud servers perform the necessary
computations, and there are no explicit inputs for the two servers. After the execution of
7the OP-PUC protocol, each Ai receives a value denoted by δi for the minimum amount of
the energy consumption that needs to be reduced by Ai. The other participating entities
do not receive any outputs.
During the execution of the OP-PUC protocol, ai is private to Ai and should not
be disclosed to the other households. In addition, ai should not be known to the two cloud
servers and the utility company. Since t is private to the utility company C, t should not
be known to the other participating entities.
• ai is only known to Ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
• t is only known to C.
1.2. ASSUMPTIONS
In this dissertation, choosing an optimal value for t is not discussed. In general,
the value of threshold t is set by the utility company C. Approaches based on threshold
are not new and have been commonly used in various problems within the smart grid
environment (e.g., [16, 17, 18]). Nevertheless, deciding the value of t is an important step
in threshold-based approaches, including the proposed protocols. The existing threshold-
based approaches do not address how to decide the value of t. In particular to the proposed
protocols, the value of t may vary between the neighborhoods. Some important factors
that decide the value of t are (i) number of households in the neighborhood, (ii) percentage
of residential, industrial, or commercial consumers in the neighborhood, and (iii) time and
location of the neighborhood. These three factors will enable C to set an appropriate
value of t for a given neighborhood. Alternatively, the utility company can use the existing
historical dataset available from the neighborhood to predict a suitable t value using the
data mining techniques.
Since the usages are random, even when the total power usage exceeds the threshold,
there may not be an outage (as the usage may fall below the threshold shortly). This is
termed as false alarm. Even in the case of false alarm, reducing the power consumed by
households will only act as a precautionary step, and there are no negative consequences
8in doing so. The goal of this dissertation is to develop P-PUC protocols. Therefore,
estimating the false alarm probability, which itself is a separate and interesting problem,
is outside the scope of this dissertation.
Also, in this dissertation, network delays were not considered. First of all, the
threshold value t is not an upper-bound on power consumption. Instead, t was chosen
to help the utility company efficiently manage and distribute the power for any given
neighborhood. Therefore, even if there is a delay, there will be a sufficient gap between t
and the upper-bound on power consumption. Nevertheless, the network delays in smart
grid environments are usually in milliseconds. Hence, even in the case of network delays,
the households will shortly cut down their usages if necessary (assuming a > t) and the
total power usage will fall below t.
The threat model adopted for the dissertation is the commonly accepted security
definition of secure multiparty computation (SMC). More specifically, the participating en-
tities are assumed to be semi-honest; that is, the entities follow the prescribed procedures
of the protocol. Under the semi-honest model, it is implicit that the participating entities
do not collude. Another adversary model of SMC is the malicious model. Under the ma-
licious model, the entities can behave arbitrarily. Most efficient SMC-protocols are secure
under the semi-honest model since fewer steps are needed to enforce honest behaviors. The
following are motivations to adopt the semi-honest model:
• The P-PUC protocols need to be sufficiently efficient. Between the semi-honest model
and the malicious model, the semi-honest model always leads to much more efficient
protocol.
• Smart meters can be made tamper proof, so the households cannot modify the read-
ings from smart meters or the messages sent from the smart meters to the power
company. Thus, the semi-honest model fits this problem domain well regarding the
households.
9• The cloud service providers and the utility company are legitimate business. It is hard
to see they collude and initiate any malicious act to discover the private smart meter
readings. For well-known and reputable cloud servers (e.g., Amazon and Google), it
makes sense to assume they follow the protocol and behave semi-honestly.
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2. RELATED WORK
A smart grid is more efficient, more resilient, and more affordable to manage and
operate than a traditional power grid. In the smart grid, the power company can not
only gather power consumption information from power users (as in a traditional power
grid), but also send information flow to power users for smart control and emergency
services. However, big benefits come along with tremendous risks. The smart grid could
also be vulnerable to various cyber security threats. New functions (e.g. smart control of
household devices) provide many opportunities for cyber attacks such as spoofing attacks
[19] and man-in-the-middle attacks [20]. Those vulnerabilities, when mastered by malicious
attackers, could be used to launch cyber attacks to steal energy, affect the quality of service
(QoS) of a power grid, or even lead to cascading failures of the whole power network, which
could result in huge financial losses.
At the same time, to achieve smart control and better load balancing, a smart
grid needs to frequently collect and analyze energy consumption data of individual power
users. However, the existing literature showed that with the collection of 15-minute in-
terval household energy consumption data, major home appliances will be detected with
accuracy rates of over 90 percent [12]. In addition, it has been shown that the identifi-
cation success rate is nearly perfect regarding larger two-state household appliances such
as dryers, refrigerators, air conditioners, water heaters, and well pumps[21]. A survey on
different types of information that can be inferred from the power consumption data is
given in [22]. For example, using the household power consumption data, other household
activities such as how many people are at home, sleeping routines, and eating routines can
also be inferred [19, 23].
Because of these security and privacy risks, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) rolled out guidelines [6] for some security and privacy issues, which
could be classified into three categories: Integrity, Confidentiality and Availability. In this
dissertation, customer privacy issues are the main focus. Privacy issues are included in
Confidentiality. However, in this dissertation, Privacy is highlighted as one distinct point.
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That is because Confidentiality is to protect information against unauthorized parties,
whereas Privacy can also be violated by authorized parties:
• Integrity: Protecting against the unauthorized modification or destruction of infor-
mation. In the smart grid, data should not be modified without authorization; the
source of data should be authenticated; the time stamp associated with the data
should be known and authenticated; and the quality of the data should be known
and authenticated. Loss of Integrity would lead to unauthorized modification or de-
struction of the information. For example, if a malicious customer alters his meter
readings, he can commit energy theft to gain profit. On the other hand, if an attacker
successfully controls a group of meters and injects fake data, the state estimation
made by the controllers will be incorrect so that failures might happen in the power
grid.
• Confidentiality: Protecting privacy and proprietary information by authorized re-
strictions on information access and disclosure. In the smart grid, customer infor-
mation, power consumption data, and network topology information should not be
disclosed to unauthorized parties. Loss of confidentiality would disclose the informa-
tion to unauthorized parties. For example, robbers who learn the individual power
consumption data can infer the daily lifestyle of the customer so as to rob the house
when nobody is there. Attackers who gain control of the network topology can have a
view of the entire network and find weak points for invasion. Competitor companies
who control the customer information can make opposite strategies to seize markets.
• Privacy: Partly included in Confidentiality. On the other hand, authorized parties in
the smart grid (e.g. utility companies) cannot be fully trusted. With Confidentiality
breaks, attackers who master customer information can make inferences about indi-
viduals’ daily living. Authorized parties like utility companies are also potential risks
for users’ privacy. Utility companies may sell customer data to third party advertis-
ers to gain profit, or the employees of utility companies can get the customer data
by chance. If individuals’ time-series collections of power usage data are disclosed to
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adversaries, bad things might happen. Therefore, the privacy requirement is high-
lighted: high frequently collection of power consumption data cannot be disclosed,
even to authorized parties.
• Availability: Ensuring timely and reliable access to information and services. Avail-
ability will not be discussed further here, since the issue is far from privacy.
Some survey papers have already studied the security and privacy issues in a smart
grid. Cyber security in the smart grid: Survey and challenges [24] gave a review of security
issues in the smart grid. This paper discussed many potential attacks and made a use case
study for their critical security requirements. Next, it went through existing counter attack
solutions from both networking (including attack detection and attack mitigation mech-
anisms) and cryptography (including encryption, authentication, and key management).
This paper also proposed research challenges from different aspects.
A survey on cyber security for smart grid communications [25] is another survey
focusing on the cyber security issues of smart grid communications. The authors proposed
security requirements of smart grid communications among confidentiality, availability, and
integrity. Then they showed the challenges such as internetworking, security policy and
operations, and security services. They studied the current solutions of privacy, integrity,
authentication, and trusted computing as well.
At the rest of this chapter, existing works about spoofing attacks in smart grid
communication networks will be reviewed at first. Then, existing security authentication
schemes to keep smart grid system integrity will be studied. Literature that addresses
privacy problems will be demonstrated last.
2.1. SPOOFING ATTACKS
A spoofing attack is a scenario in which an attacker successfully pretends to be
another and gains unauthorized access. In a smart grid network, the goal for a spoofing
attack might be:
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• Smart meter spoofing: The attacker masquerades as a smart meter and can send
fake data to the readers and collectors. The purpose of the attack can be energy
theft or even to mislead power grid state estimation.
• Data reader/collector spoofing: The attacker acts as a data collector and learns
the users’ private information, which might be used in other inference attacks (e.g.
robbery).
• Controller spoofing: The attacker pretends to be a controller and learns messages
between other controllers and smart meters to make inference attacks; or even worse,
the attacker can gain access to modify network packets to launch Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks.
Although the smart meters are assumed to be protected from physical damages
(tamper-resistant) in many existing works, since legacy meters will still be part of the
power grid system in the near future, old meters are vulnerable points for the whole grid.
Unlike traditional power grid, a smart grid introduces new features (for example, smart
meters also have storage and computation abilities and can send and receive messages from
other smart devices) in order to make smart control and demand requests. To fulfill these
new tasks, smart devices are connected to the network and utilize different communication
methods such as zig-bee and wireless, which leads to various vulnerabilities. For instance,
the authors of Neighborhood watch: security and privacy analysis of automatic meter read-
ing systems [19] showed that automatic meter reading (AMR) systems are vulnerable to
spoofing attacks. They studied the wireless signals sent by AMR meters and found that
no encryption mechanism was applied, so adversaries could decode the signal easily to get
the real message information. Besides, adversaries can also act as meters to send fake mes-
sages to the readers, possibly to commit energy theft. Considering so many AMR meters
had already been deployed in the US, the authors in [19] suggested a ”Jammer add-on”
solution, which required attaching an extra hardware device to every AMR meters to jam
the original signal. Whenever a reader device came, it would temporally close the jammer
device so that real data would be read. The authors claimed that this method did not
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require updating the whole AMR meter system from either software or hardware. Yet a
new problem came: the new jammer devices also needed to be tamper-resistant.
Another paper Man-in-the-middle attack test-bed investigating cyber-security vul-
nerabilities in smart grid scada systems [20] showed a man-in-the-middle attack test-bed
to the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system of the smart grid. To-
day, the SCADA system’s architecture is open standard and protocols and distributes
functionalities across a wide area network (WAN), which allows more and more interop-
erability, connectivity, and compatibility. However, these new features make the systems
more vulnerable to various unintentional or malicious cyber attacks. Introduced in Man-
in-the-middle attack test-bed investigating cyber-security vulnerabilities in smart grid scada
systems [20], the attacker can first launch an ARP spoofing attack to associate a malicious
host’s MAC address with the IP of a target host. Then he could perform a man-in-the-
middle attack and gain access to confidential information.
2.2. SMART METER AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES
One way to address the aforementioned problems is to provide concrete and effi-
cient authentication schemes for communications in the smart grid. Existing smart meter
authentication schemes are reviewed next since smart meters are usually plotted at the
users’ houses and more vulnerable than other smart grid infrastructures. The computa-
tion ability of smart meters is also highly restricted. Therefore, the authentication scheme
adopted needs to be significantly efficient.
A lightweight message authentication scheme for smart grid communications [26]
talks about a situation in which Internet Protocol (IP)-based communication technolo-
gies are considered to set up smart grid communication networks. In this kind of smart
grid communication network, a wide variety of malicious attacks that existed in IP-based
schemes, such as replay, traffic analysis, and denial of service attacks, also need to be
addressed in the smart grid. Considering the limited resources (i.e., low memory and com-
putational capacity) of the smart meters, when facing some time-critical demand request
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and keeping the quality of service, the smart grid needs an efficient authentication mech-
anism. Therefore, the authors proposed a lightweight message authentication scheme for
securing communication amongst various smart meters at different points of the SG based
on the Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol and hash-based message authentication
code.
Multicast authentication in the smart grid with one-time signature [27] proposed a
multicast authentication scheme in the smart grid using a one-time signature. Compared
with the existing multicast authentication scheme, HORS, their scheme reduced the stor-
age overhead of the receivers by a factor of 8. Their scheme could also flexibly allocate
the increased computations between the sender and receiver based on their computing
resources. However, they assumed an adversary could eavesdrop some valid signatures to
make a signature forgery attack and compare the possibility to link those signatures to the
real message with their scheme, whereas the possibility of this link is really insignificant.
In A privacy preserving and secure authentication protocol for the advanced me-
tering infrastructure with non-repudiation service [28], the authors proposed an ID-based
authentication protocol for the advanced metering infrastructure. This protocol can pro-
vide source authentication, data integrity, and non-repudiation services while preserving
the end-customer’s privacy.
Considering the security issues happen during the data transmission between smart
meters and utility servers, Authentication and key management for advanced metering in-
frastructures utilizing physically unclonable functions [29] proposed an approach based on
PUF (physically unclonable function) technology for providing a hardware-based authenti-
cation of smart meters and an efficient key management scheme. Their major advantage by
using PUFs was that there was no need to modify the existing smart meter communication
system (no software or hardware upgrades were needed).
Multilayer consensus ecc-based password authenticated key-exchange (mcepak) pro-
tocol for smart grid system [30] considered a situation in which different layers were shown
in the smart grid communication infrastructure: home area networks (HANs), building area
networks (BANs), neighbor area networks (NANs), and SG central controllers (SGCC),
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and each layer had separate controllers. Those controllers were connected from layer to
layer, and each adjacent layers shared the same password for secure communication. HAN
controllers were linked to smart appliances so that smart control from HAN controllers
could be done directly. However, the control command from the upstream controllers of
HAN had to go through different layers’ re-encryptions which made it much too costly. To
address this problem, the authors of Multilayer consensus ecc-based password authenticated
key-exchange (mcepak) protocol for smart grid system [30] presented a multilayer consen-
sus elliptic curve cryptography based password authenticated key exchange (MCEPAK)
protocol that allowed each new smart meter to be authenticated and share a password
with every upstream controller in an efficient way.
The authors of A privacy-preserving smart metering scheme using linkable anony-
mous credential [31] tried to build a scheme that could not only authenticate the messages
sent from smart meters, but also preserve the user’s privacy. They used Camenisch-
Lysyanskaya (CL) signature to build a linkable anonymous credential protocol and pro-
posed a privacy-preserving smart metering scheme based on the new linkable anonymous
credential. Their protocol also had the property to trace the fault meters. However, it was
not clear in their authentication scheme if meter credentials were used.
2.3. PRIVACY PRESERVATION
Even if messages in smart grid communication are authenticated and fully pro-
tected, there are potential privacy implications that arise from the collection and usage
of smart grid data [32, 33]. As mentioned before in this chapter, fine-grained collections
of power usage data can be used to identify most household appliances. It is clear that
there is a strong need to develop privacy-preserving frameworks for various problems in the
smart grid infrastructure. There have been considerable works along privacy-preserving
smart grids from different aspects:
• Power Consumption Data Aggregation: A number of papers [34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,
40, 41, 42] utilized data aggregation techniques to hide the sensitive information.
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Basically, the power consumption data of a group of customers were aggregated
together so that even fine-grained data collection would not leak an individual cus-
tomer’s private information. However, the extent to which those data could be used
for analysis to keep the quality of service (e.g., the state estimation decided from
aggregated data may not be accurate enough) was not clear. At the same time, the
aggregation technique could not totally overcome the privacy issues either.
• Dynamic Energy Management through Battery: Another big category of works in-
volves using rechargeable battery algorithms [43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49] to mask the
real household usage patterns. Typically, those batteries were combined with power
controllers and deployed for each individual household. Their function was to make
the meter load close to constant. The battery was deployed between the meter and
the household, so the meter would record the energy charging the battery in each
time-series. When household appliances needed more energy, the battery would dis-
charge more; on the contrary, the battery will recharge. Yet, those methods usually
need to have the prior knowledge of household activities in hand to make perfect
masks. These methods are not safe if the adversaries already know the algorithms
power controllers use.
• Power Usage Data Anonymization: Power usage data anonymization is another di-
rection for preserving the user’s privacy. For example, in Smart grid privacy via
anonymization of smart metering data [50] an anonymization technique was studied.
Smart meters were set with two IDs by a trusted third party (e.g., the manufactur-
ers). One ID was known by the utility company, and the other ID was anonymous.
The known ID was attached to low frequency data message packets that were used
for billing purpose while the anonymous ID was attached to high frequency data
message packets that were used for analysis. Even the utility company didn’t know
the relation between the two IDs. However, in Smart metering depseudonymiza-
tion [51] the authors showed an attack model in which the knowledge of anonymous
consumption traces and some recent activities of a household allowed attackers to
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link the household’s identity to its consumption trace so they could launch inference
attacks.
• State Estimation Vector Obfuscation: In Cooperative state estimation for preserv-
ing privacy of user behaviors in smart grid [52], a privacy-preserving cooperative
state estimation technique was investigated. Based on an unbiased linear estimation
scheme [53], the authors developed a protocol that enabled each smart meter to add
a distributed obfuscation vector to mask an individual’s original measurements and,
later, keep the result of estimation same. However, the authors didn’t give a concrete
security proof, so the privacy-preserving property might not be guaranteed.
Although many works had been posted to use privacy-preserving technologies in a
smart grid system, they do not address the P-PUC problem in particular. The protocols
presented in [13, 14] are the only existing work related to the proposed problem. The first
two P-PUC protocols proposed in [13] were built based on two strategies. The protocols
were efficient, whereas the total energy consumption was leaked to one of the households,
and the maximum energy consumption among the households was also revealed. In addi-
tion, the secure division protocol utilized before was among several proposed protocols in
[54], which were either not secure or not efficient.
In [14], another two P-PUC protocols were developed to address the security issues
of the earlier P-PUC protocols. The protocols were more secure and practical. Secure




This chapter include a brief review of a basic smart grid control system model.
Some preliminaries that are highlighted include: the security definition of this work under
the semi-honest model and the cryptography techniques adopted in this dissertation.
3.1. SMART GRID SYSTEM MODEL
Figure 3.1. gives a typical view of the smart grid control system. In this system,
each household is equipped with a smart meter that links to every smart device in the
household through a home area network (HAN). The smart meters deployed under the
same neighborhood, combined with a substation/data-concentrator, compose a neighbor-
hood area network (NAN). At the same time, substations connect to the utility company
through the wide area network (WAN). For each level of network, there are different priv-
ilege levels of controllers that manage data flow and make smart controls. To assist with
the work of the controllers, the smart meters not only read or deliver normal power con-
sumption information in a very high frequency (e.g., 15-minute intervals), but also have
some computation abilities to help higher level controllers (e.g., deployed in the utility
company) to make smart controls. Here are the functionalities of the main components in
a smart grid control system:
• Utility company: has the central controller, is in charge of analyzing data and billing.
The utility company connects to multiple substations through the WAN. Sometimes
the utility company would handle data analysis tasks in order to make smart controls
for household appliances. They could also give these jobs to third party service
providers. Alarms and alerts are also the responsibilities of utility company. It could
send the highest level control signals during an emergency condition.
• Substation/data-concentrator: has a data collector that collects data from the smart
meters in a neighborhood. The link between the substation/data-concentrator and
the smart meter could be wired or wireless connections (e.g., in some existing AMR
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Figure 3.1. An Overview of Smart Grid Control System
systems, meter data could be gathered by car-carried readers remotely). After ac-
cumulation, the substation/data-concentrator transfers the processed data to the
utility company. It could also route the messages between smart meters and the
utility company.
• Smart meter: has a micro-controller and limited power, storage, and computation
ability. Smart meters can engage in two-way communications with substations and
household devices. They may also have the functionality to enable utility companies
or customers to remotely connect or disconnect home appliances and services.
3.2. PRELIMINARIES
This section includes a discussion of the security definition of this dissertation. The
tools of this study, additive homomorphic encryption that forms the core of P-PUC and
Yao’s garbled circuit that used to build the secure division protocol for OP-PUC are also
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introduced. A definition and some notations that are used throughout this paper are
presented at the end of this section.
3.2.1. Security Definition. The security definition adopted in this paper is from
the field of secure multi-party computation (MPC). The notion of MPC was first introduced
by Yao who also proposed a provably secure solution for the well-known Millionaires’
problem (under two-party setting). Briefly, the Millionaires’ problem involves two parties,
holding their private wealths, who want to know which one is richer without revealing their
actual wealth to the other party [55, 56]. This work was later extended to the multi-party
case by Goldreich et al. [57], and it was shown that any computation that can be done in
polynomial time by a single party can also be done securely by multiple parties. Since then,
there have been many theoretical advancements as well as practical frameworks developed
for the multi-party case [58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63].
In this paper, it is assumed that the parties are semi-honest, often referred to as
honest-but-curious, where each party follows the rules of the specified protocol but is free
to later deduce any additional information by using the intermediate results the party sees
during the execution of the protocol. Under the semi-honest model, whatever a party can
infer from its private input and output is not considered as a privacy violation. More
specifically, this paper adopts the semi-honest security definition from the field of MPC
[64]. Briefly, the following definition captures the security definition under the semi-honest
model.
Definition 1. Let ai be the input of party Ai, V IEWi(pi) be Ai’s execution image of
the protocol pi and δi be the output for Ai computed from pi. Then, pi is secure if V IEWi(pi)
can be simulated from 〈ai, δi〉 and distribution of the simulated image is computationally
indistinguishable from V IEWi(pi).
In this definition, an execution image generally includes the input, the output,
and the messages communicated during an execution of a protocol. To prove a protocol
is secure under the semi-honest model, one generally needs to show that the execution
image of a protocol does not leak any information regarding the private inputs of the
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participating parties [64]. The reader may refer to The Foundations of Cryptography [64]
for more detailed security definitions and their proofs.
3.2.2. Additive Homomorphic Probabilistic Encryption. This paper uti-
lizes an additive homomorphic and probabilistic public key encryption system (denoted by
HEnc), such as Paillier cryptosystem [65], for constructing our secure protocols. Let Epk
and Dpr be the encryption and decryption functions based on the HEnc system with public
key pk and private key pr. It is then impossible for a computationally bounded adversary
to decrypt any given ciphertext successfully in polynomial time without the private key
pr. In addition, let N denote the group size or RSA modulus (which is usually of 1024
bits). For any two given plaintexts m1,m2 ∈ ZN , the HEnc system exhibits the following
properties [66].
• Homomorphic Addition:
Epk(m1 +m2)← Epk(m1) ∗ Epk(m2);
• Homomorphic Multiplication:
Epk(m1 ∗m2)← E(m2)m1 ;
• Semantic Security: The encryption scheme is semantically secure as defined in [67,
68]. Given a set of ciphertexts, an adversary cannot deduce any additional informa-
tion about the plaintext. This further implies that the ciphertexts are statistically
indistinguishable under chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA).
Any HEnc system can be used to implement the proposed protocols. Depending on the
underlying HEnc system used, the homomorphic additions or multiplications are followed
by modulo operations for security reasons. For example, in the Paillier cryptosystem
[65], operations on ciphertexts are always followed by a modulo N2 operation in order to
ensure that the resulting ciphertext is still in ZN2 and uniformly random. For presentation
purposes, the modulo operations are simply omitted in the rest of this paper.
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3.2.3. Yao’s Garbled Circuit. In order to implement an efficient secure division
protocol for OP-PUC in which all input values are promised to be encrypted, the garbled
circuit approach introduced by Yao [69] is adopted. Yao’s garbled circuit is a method
Proposed by Andrew Yao in 1986 for Secure multi-party computation[69]. Basically, this
protocol evaluate a function between two-party under semi-honest adversaries, and at the
end of the protocol, the value of function is outputted without leaking any information
to each party except the output value. In more detail, there is one party called garbler
and another party called evaluator. At first, the garbler builds a ‘garbled’ version of
circuit computing function. Then this function along with garbler ’s input values (garbled
corresponding to garbler ’s real input values) are given to the evaluator. Upon receiving
these, the evaluator obliviously obtains the garbled corresponding inputs of him by using
1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol[70, 71, 72]. After this, the evaluator have all the
inputs to calculate the function.
Recently, an intermediate language for describing and executing garbled circuits -
the GCParser [73] has been proposed. This framework can implement any optimizations
at both the high level and the low level, and it has already been applied to optimizing free
XOR-gates and pipelining circuit generation and execution. We adopt this framework to
build a garbled circuit for secure division.
3.2.4. Notations. Some common notations that are used extensively in this paper
are shown in Table 3.1..
Definition 2. Let a1, . . . , an be the average power consumptions of n households in
a given neighborhood. We define amax as the maximum value out of the n power usages,
i.e., amax = max(a1, . . . , an). In addition, for any given integer x such that 0 ≤ x < l and
2m−1 ≤ l < 2m, we define [x] as a vector of encryptions of the individual bits of x. More
formally, we define [x] as follows:
[x] = 〈Epk(Bx[1]), . . . , Epk(Bx[m])〉
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Table 3.1. Common Notations
SMC Secure Multi-Party Computation
P-PUC Threshold-Based Power Usage Control
OP-PUC Outsourceable P-PUC
HEnc An additive homomorphic probabilistic encryption system
〈Epk, Dpr〉 A pair of encryption and decryption functions based on the
HEnc system with 〈pk, pr〉 as the public-private key pair
C The utility company
n Number of households in a given neighborhood
Ai i
th household in the neighborhood
S1 and S2 Two independent cloud servers
ai Average power consumption for household Ai
a′i and a
′′
i Secret shares of ai between two parties
a Sum of average power consumption in the neighborhood
a′ and a′′ Secret shares of a between two parties
t Threshold value for the neighborhood
t′ and t′′ Secret shares of t between two parties
Amax User with the maximum average power consumption in the neighborhood
amax Maximum average power consumption in the neighborhood
l Domain size for a and t
m Bit length of domain size l
Bx Binary representation vector for integer x
δi The lower bound of power user Ai has to cut off if a > t
where l is the domain size of x and m is the minimum number of bits required to
represent l. Bx is the vector denoting the binary representation of x such that Bx[1] and
Bx[m] are the most and least significant bits of x respectively.
For example, let us assume that x = 5 and m = 4. Then [x = 5] is given by
〈Epk(0), Epk(1), Epk(0), Epk(1)〉. Also, if r is a random number chosen from group ZN , it
is denoted by r ∈R ZN .
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4. PRIVACY-PRESERVING POWER USAGE CONTROL
The first attempt at building P-PUC protocols, which are privacy-preserving power
usage control protocols, is proposed in Privacy-Preserving Power Usage Control in the
Smart Grid [13]. This chapter introduces the details of these protocols. A naive way
to implement privacy-preserving power usage control is to utilize a trusted third party
(TTP). As shown in Figure 4.1., each participating user Ai sends ai to a TTP, and the
utility company sends t to the TTP. Then, the TTP compares t with a =
∑n
i=1 ai. If
t < a, the TTP computes δi and sends it to Ai. Under this TTP-based P-PUC protocol,
the privacy-preserving requirements can be easily achieved. However, such a TTP hardly
exists in practice. Therefore, the goal of this chapter is to develop P-PUC protocols without
utilizing a TTP so that the protocols achieve a similar degree of privacy protection as if
there were a TTP.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1. proposes two P-PUC
protocols suitable for different adjustment strategies, Section 4.2. discusses the security
issues regarding the proposed protocols, and Section 4.3. gives some experimental results.
4.1. PRIVACY-PRESERVING POWER USAGE CONTROL PROTOCOLS
According to the two power usage adjustment strategies discussed in Section 1.1.,
two privacy-preserving TPUC protocols: P-PUC1 and P-PUC2 for strategy 1 and strategy
2, respectively, are proposed. The following assumptions must be made before introducing
these two protocols:
• Following the previous notations: A1, . . . , An denote n users in a participating neigh-
borhood, and a1, . . . , an denote the average power usage during a fixed time interval
set by their utility company C.
• Let a = ∑ni=1 ai, and amax ∈ {a1, . . . , an} denotes the maximum individual energy
usage of user Amax ∈ {A1, . . . , An}. Without loss of generality and for illustration










Figure 4.1. TTP-based P-PUC protocol
practice, a1, . . . , an can be fraction numbers. Before using the proposed protocols,
they need to be scaled up to become integers. At the end, the final results returned
from the protocols are divided by the scaling factor to obtain the appropriate values.
• The ideal privacy-preserving requirements presented in Section 1.1. are difficult to
achieve without using a trusted third party. In the proposed protocols, the privacy-
preserving requirements are relaxed a little bit:
– Under strategy 1: Only a and amax can be disclosed to A1, . . . , An.
– Under strategy 2: Only a can be disclosed to A1, . . . , An.
The relaxed requirements allow more efficient protocols to be developed.
• One of the consumers (say A1) plays an important role in performing some inter-
mediate operations on handling some overall tasks of the neighborhood. Since every
user in the neighborhood is equivalent, A1 can also be chosen in an equal probability
based on any leader election algorithm.
• It is assumed that the consumers and the utility company are semi-honest. That
is, each party (either Ai or C) behaves as per the rules of the protocol; however,
he/she is free to later deduce any additional information by utilizing the messages
seen during the execution of the protocol [64]. This further implies that there is no
collusion between the parties.
Both P-PUC1 and P-PUC2 protocols require several secure primitive protocols as
subroutines, and these secure primitive protocols are defined as follows:
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• Secure Sum(a1, . . . , an)→ a
There are n (at least three) parties participating in this protocol, and each party
Ai has ai as the input to the protocol. At the end of the protocol, summation a is
known only to A1.
• Secure Max(a1, . . . , an)→ amax
There are n parties participating in this protocol, and each party Ai has ai as the
input to the protocol. At the end of the protocol, amax is known to every participating
party, but ai is only known to Ai.
• Secure Compare(a, t)→ 1 if a > t, and 0 otherwise
There are 2 participants in this protocol. At the end, both parties know if a > t.
• Secure Division((x1, y1), (x2, y2))→ x1+x2y1+y2
There are 2 participants in this protocol. The private inputs (x1, y1) are from party




All these primitives have privacy-preserving properties in which the private input values
are never disclosed to other participating parties. Next, let us discuss the implementations
of these primitives based on existing research.
4.1.1. Implementations of Secure Primitives. There are several ways to im-
plement the Secure Sum protocol. In this chapter, a randomization approach is adopted,
and the main steps of the protocol are given below (N indicates a very large integer):
1. A1 randomly selects r ∈ {0, N − 1}, computes s1 = a1 + r mod N , and sends s1 to
A2.
2. Ai, for 1 < i < n, receives si−1, computes si = si−1 + ai mod N , and sends si to
Ai+1.
3. An receives sn−1, computes sn = sn−1 + an mod N , and sends sn to A1.
4. A1 receives sn, computes a = sn − r mod N .
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Because r is randomly chosen, s1 is also a random value from A2’s perspective. Therefore,
from s1, A2 is not able to discover a1. Following the same reason, a1, . . . , an are never
disclosed to the other users during the computation process. Because A1 is the only party
who knows r, a can be derived correctly by A1.
The steps proposed in [74] are adopted to implement the Secure Max protocol. For
Secure Compare, we can use the generic solution given in [60]. Different solutions from [54]
and [75] are considered to implement Secure Division. An efficiency and security trade-off
analysis between different Secure Division sub-protocols are proposed in Section 4.3..
4.1.2. The P-PUC1 Protocol. Once all the primitives described before are ob-
tained, the P-PUC1 protocol can be easily implemented. Key steps are given below:
1. A1 obtains a← Secure Sum(a1, . . . , an)
2. A1 and the utility company jointly perform the Secure Compare protocol.
If Secure Compare(a, t) = 1, then
(a) Each Ai obtains amax ← Secure Max(a1, . . . , an)
(b) Amax (self-identified via amax) reduces his or her energy consumption
3. Repeat these steps until Secure Compare(a, t) = 0
Since A1 has the value a, the Secure Compare protocol at step 2 can only be executed
between A1 and the utility company. However, any user can become A1, and this can be
achieved through a leader election process among the users to determine who wants to be
A1. Alternatively, A1 could be randomly chosen before each execution of the protocol.
4.1.3. The P-PUC2 Protocol. In this protocol, A1 is also responsible for the
secure summation and secure comparison operations. An additive homomorphic proba-
bilistic public key encryption (HEnc) system is used as the building block in the proposed
protocol. The private key is only known to the utility company, and the public key is
known to all the participating users. Let Epk and Dpr be the encryption and decryption
functions in an HEnc system with public key pk and private key pr. Without pr, no one
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can discover x from Epk(x) in polynomial time. When the context is clear, the pk and pr
subscripts in Epk and Dpr are omitted. The HEnc system has the following properties:
• The encryption function is additive homomorphic: Epk(x1)×Epk(x2) = Epk(x1 +x2);
• Given a constant c and Epk(x), Epk(x)c = Epk(c · x);
• The encryption function has semantic security as defined in The knowledge complexity
of interactive proof systems [67], i.e., a set of ciphertexts do not provide additional
information about the plaintext to an adversary or Epk(x) 6= Epk(x) with a very high
probability.
• The domain and range of the encryption system are suitable.
Any HEnc system is applicable, but in this paper Paillier’s public-key homomorphic en-
cryption system [65] is adopted due to its efficiency. Informally speaking, the public key in
the system is (g,N), where N is resulted from multiplication of two large prime numbers
and g ∈ Z∗N2 is randomly chosen.
To implement the P-PUC2 protocol according to Equation 3, each user Ai needs to
calculate ai·t
a
between Ai and the utility company C so that ai is not disclosed to C and t
is not disclosed to Ai. The Secure Division primitive and an HEnc system will be adopted




(a− t) = ai − ai · t
a
(3)
Assume that E(t) is broadcasted by the utility company initially. The main steps of the
P-PUC2 protocol are given below:
1. A1 obtains a← Secure Sum(a1, . . . , an)
2. A1 and the utility company C jointly perform the Secure Compare protocol.
If Secure Compare(a, t) = 1, then
(a) A1 randomly selects r from {0, N − 1}
– Set y1 = N − r and y2 = a+ r mod N
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– Send y1 to A2, . . . , An and y2 to C
(b) Each Ai (2 ≤ i ≤ n) randomly selects ri from {0, N − 1}
– Compute E(t)ai to get E(ai · t)
– Set x1i = N − ri and si = E(ai · t)× E(ri) = E(ai · t+ ri)
– Send si to C
(c) The utility company C sets x2i = D(si) for 2 ≤ i ≤ n
(d) For 2 ≤ i ≤ n, Ai with input (x1i, y1) and C with input (x2i, y2)
jointly perform the Secure Division protocol
– Ai obtains κi = Secure Division((x1i, y1), (x2i, y2))
– Ai sets δi = ai − κi
– Ai reduces his or her power consumption according to δi
A1 in the P-PUC2 protocol is a designated user in the participating neighborhood who is
responsible for computing a and distributing N − r to the other users and a + r mod N
to the utility company. Note that a computed at step 1 should not include the value a1,
(This can easily be achieved through a small modification to the Secure Sum protocol)
and A1 does not adjust his or her energy consumption. This prevents the disclosure of t
to A1. For instance, if A1 obtains a δ1, A1 can derive t based on Equation 3. To be fair,
A1 can be randomly selected among the participating users before each execution of the
protocol.
The purpose of step 2(a) is to hide a from the utility company and the other
users. Since r is randomly chosen, y1 and y2 are randomly distributed in {0, N − 1}. As
a result, the other users A2, . . . , An cannot discover a from y1, and similarly, the utility
company cannot discover a from y2. The goal of step 2(b) is to hide ai from the utility
company and t from Ai. Since the encryption scheme is semantically secure, from E(t) and
without the private key, the users cannot learn anything about t. In addition, because ri is
randomly chosen, the x2i value computed at step 2(c) does not reveal anything regarding
ai. The operations performed at steps 2(b) and 2(c) are based on the aforementioned
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additive homomorphic property of the encryption function E. Since x1i + x2i = ai · t and
y1 + y2 = a, κi =
ai·t
a
, the protocol correctly returns δi for each Ai, except for A1.
4.2. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Regarding the P-PUC1 protocol, a is disclosed to A1 and amax is disclosed to all the
participating users. Since a is aggregated information, the disclosure of a can hardly cause
any privacy violations. Although amax is disclosed, no one can link amax to a particular
user. Thus, the disclosure risk of the P-PUC1 protocol is not significant.
The P-PUC2 protocol only discloses a to A1, so it is more secure compared to the
P-PUC1 protocol. However, because the Secure Division protocol needs to be executed
between every user and the utility company, the protocol is less efficient than P-PUC1.
Therefore, depending on whether security or efficiency is more important, both proposed
protocols are applicable in practice.
4.3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The protocols were implemented in C using the Paillier encryption scheme [65].
All experiments were conducted on a Linux machine running Ubuntu 10.04 LTS with
Intel R© Xeon R© Six-CoreTM 3.07GHz and 12GB RAM.
For P-PUC1, the main components are Secure Sum, Secure Compare, and Se-
cure Max. Since the Secure Sum protocol only performs additions, and the size of the
input from each party is 1, the protocol is very efficient. For Secure Max, a probabilistic
scheme [74] is adopted in which multiple rounds of communications and computations are
involved. The computation complexity of this part is very neglectable since there are only
several simple operations for each party. On the other hand, one must consider the com-
munication. Since the result accuracy of this protocol increases steadily with the number
of rounds performed and introduced in [74], accuracy is nearly 100% when 5 rounds of
computation are performed. In this computation, 5 rounds are adopted. As the input size
for each party in every round is still 1, this protocol is also acceptable. Considering the
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Secure Compare protocol, the total computation time for m = 10 is 1.12 seconds. Even
for the larger m = 50, the computation time is still less than 6 seconds. Figure 4.2. gives
the overall computation time of P-PUC1 for every involved party in one iteration. The use
of Ai denotes the average cost for Ai. As shown in Figure 4.2., the computation costs of
A1, C, and Ai are 0.36, 0.76, and <0.01 second, respectively, for m = 10. The computation
times of A1 and C are linear, expanding with the bit length of domain size increasing as
expected, whereas the portion of computations of each individual Ai is small and con-
stant. This is because individual Ai only makes simple computations during Secure Sum
and Secure Max, while the most time consuming part, Secure Compare, is executed by
A1 and C. This approach is really suitable for the condition in which the smart meter
has a very limited processing ability compared to other devices in the network. And in
such condition, the work of A1 could also be given to a data concentrator deployed in the


















Figure 4.2. Complexity of P-PUC1 for n = 50
The P-PUC2 protocol is composed of Secure Sum, Secure Compare, and Secure
Division. The Secure Sum and Secure Compare protocols are studied in the last para-
graph. For Secure Division, there is a trade-off between security and efficiency, as shown
in Table 4.1.. Two division protocols are adopted from [54]. The protocol using Oblivious
Transfer takes 2.15 seconds for 50 divisions (compare to a neighborhood size of n = 50),
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Table 4.1. A Comparison of Secure Division Protocols
Secure Division Protocol Fully Secure Time (for n = 50)
Division using Oblivious Transfer [54] No 21.5 seconds
Division using Homomorphic Encryption [54] No 6.92 seconds
Division using Bit Representation [75] Yes more than 50 hours
and the Homomorphic Encryption based protocol takes 6.92 seconds for the same data
size. However, those protocols are not fully secure. A more secure protocol [75] may take
more than an hour for 1 division. A Secure Division protocol that is both fully secure and
efficient is needed for P-PUC2.
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5. PRIVACY-PRESERVING POWER USAGE CONTROL WITH
MINIMUM INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
The solutions shown in Chapter 4. revealed intermediate results such as the average
total power usage a and the maximum power usage among ai’s to consumers and/or C. In
addition, the primitives that were used as building blocks in Chapter 4. are either insecure
or inefficient. Therefore, in Secure and threshold-based power usage control in smart grid
environments [14], two new P-PUC protocols based on the same two strategies are intro-
duced. This chapter gives the details of these novel protocols. The main contributions of
this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• Security - The proposed protocols provide better security than the protocols in Chap-
ter 4. in terms of protecting the individual parties’ private inputs as well as the
intermediate results. More specifically, the protocols’ security is followed from the
standard semi-honest security definition in the field of secure multi-party computa-
tion (MPC) [55, 56, 64].
• Efficiency - Efficient sub-protocols are developed for performing binary conversion,
comparison, maximum, and division operations in a privacy-preserving manner. Note
that the existing protocols in Chapter 4. utilize an inefficient generic circuit method
in order to perform the basic secure comparison operation. In addition, the existing
Secure Division protocol [75] required in P-PUC2 is very costly, which leads to the
overall inefficiency.
• Generality - The newly proposed set of sub-protocols acts as a generic solution;
therefore, the protocols can also be utilized in many other MPC applications, such
as secure electronic voting and private auctioning.
With respect to user utility, the utility company is not assumed to automatically cut off
the power supply for a user. It is assumed that users are responsible, and when they receive
an indication of using too much electricity, they can turn off one or more appliances that
are not crucial for their well-being. The threshold t is determined by the utility company
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based on its historical data, and t is generally larger than the total energy usage for a
given neighborhood. Thus, when the neighborhood’s power usage exceeds the predefined
threshold t, some households are using more energy than they normally need. Cutting off
or reducing the power usage of these households will likely not affect their daily activities.
As a result, the negative impact of reducing power consumption of these households is
minimal. Plus, as a positive impact, the proposed protocols will help these households to
effectively manage their power consumption to save on utility costs.
Since the main goal of this chapter is to develop secure P-PUC protocols, the basic
characteristics of the smart grid were not taken into consideration while developing the
protocols. Nevertheless, due to expensive encryption costs in the proposed protocols, the
communication delays (which are usually in milliseconds) and the other basic smart grid
factors will not affect the computation costs much. Hence, the proposed protocols can
easily be deployed on top of the smart grids without incurring significant overhead costs
due to the underlying smart grid models or factors.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The proposed P-PUC protocols
along with the newly proposed set of sub-protocols are discussed in detail in Section 5.1..
Section 5.2. makes some security analysis, and Section 5.3. presents various experimental
results based on the proposed protocols under different parameter settings and demon-
strates their practical value.
5.1. PRIVACY-PRESERVING POWER USAGE CONTROL WITH MINI-
MUM INFORMATION DISCLOSURE PROTOCOLS
This section presents the proposed P-PUC protocols, which are based on the two
strategies mentioned in Section 1.1.. The first protocol (following from Strategy 1) is an
iterative approach and is based on reducing the power usage for the household with the
maximum power consumption during the last time interval. Whereas, the second protocol
(following from Strategy 2) involves the computation of power reduction by each consumer,
independently. Most assumptions from the previous chapter are followed, while some of
them are updated:
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• A1 is still playing as a coordinator. However, at this time, it is assumed that A1
holds a public-private key pair (pkA1 , prA1) based on the HEnc system mentioned
in Section 3.2.. Similarly, the utility company C holds (pkC , prC). Note that the
private keys prA1 and prC are kept as secret by A1 and C, respectively.
Under the above assumption, A1 has to play a bigger role than other consumers in
the proposed protocols. Since it is not possible to perform arbitrary computations
over encrypted data by C alone, the proposed protocols require a second party (A1
in this case) to evaluate the desired functionalities in a privacy-preserving manner
(two-party secure computations). It is worth pointing out that the role of the second
party can be played by any one of the consumers. This further implies that the
second party can vary in each protocol execution. In general, before the execution
of each protocol, all the consumers can have an agreement and decide who will be
playing the role of the second party. A simple and straightforward solution is to
choose the second party in a ring topology. That is, A1 in the 1st execution, A2 in
the 2nd execution, and so on. For simplicity, A1 is treated as the second party in
the rest of this chapter.
• Suppose that 1 ≤ a, t ≤ l, where l is the maximum domain size for the values of a
and t such that 2m−1 ≤ l < 2m. At least m bits are required to represent l. This is a
practical assumption due to the following reason. Because the values of a and t are
usually small in this problem domain, the value of l can be chosen appropriately to
satisfy the condition. Also, l and m are assumed to be public. However, t remains
private to C, and a should not be revealed to consumers or C.
• Again, the consumers and the utility company are semi-honest, and all the devices
in the smart grid are tamper-resistant. That is, there will be no collusion between
individual users and the utility company and no modification of data during the
communications. However, parties can make inference of anything from what they
have.
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In the rest of this chapter, (pk, pr) are used as the public-private key pair to avoid
cluttering the presentation (in this chapter, depending on the context, (pk, pr) can be
either (pkA1 , prA1) or (pkC , prC)). Since the existing primitives used in Chapter 4. are
either insecure or inefficient, new solutions are developed to secure binary conversion,
comparison, maximum, and division problems (more details are provided later in this
section). More specifically, the proposed protocols utilize the following security primitives
as the building blocks.
• Sum Random Shares(a1, . . . , an)→ (s1, s2):
Each consumer, with his/her private input ai, participates in this protocol. At the
end of this protocol, A1 gets a random share s1 and C gets a random share s2 such
that s1 + s2 mod N = a. During this process, no other information is revealed to the
consumers or C.
• Secure Binary Conv(Epk(a))→ [a]:
C with input Epk(a) and A1 with private key compute the encryptions of the indi-
vidual bits of binary representation of a. At the end, the output [a] is known only
to C.
• Secure Comp([a], t)→ h
C with input ([a], t) and A1 with private key securely check whether a > t or not.
At the end of this protocol, only A1 knows the output h, where h = 1 if a > t, and
h = 0 otherwise.
• Secure 2P Max([x], y)→ [max(x, y)]
Consumer Ai with input ([x], y) and C with private key compute the encryptions
of the individual bits of maximum between x and y. During this process, x is not
revealed to Ai and C. In addition, y is not revealed to C. The output [max(x, y)] is
known only to Ai.
• Secure 2P Enc Max([x], [y])→ [max(x, y)]
One of the consumers, say Ai, holding ([x], [y]), and C, who has the private key,
38
are jointly involved in this protocol, where both x and y are regarded as private
information. That is, (x, y) should not be revealed to Ai and C. The output of this
protocol is the encryptions of the individual bits of maximum between x and y (i.e.,
[max(x, y)]). At the end, [max(x, y)] is revealed only to Ai.
• Secure MP Max(a1, . . . , an)→ [amax]
The n consumers (with their respective private inputs ai) and the utility company
C with private key are involved in this protocol. The output of this protocol is the
encryptions of the individual bits of max(a1, . . . , an) = amax. The output [amax] is
revealed to all consumers whereas no information is revealed to C.
• Secure Div(Epk(a), t)→ ta




During this process, neither a nor t is revealed to A1. In addition, a is not revealed
to C. At the end of Secure Div, the output t
a
is known to all consumers.
5.1.1. The P-PUC∗1 Protocol. The first protocol, denoted as P-PUC
∗
1, is based
on Strategy 1 as discussed in Section 1.1.. The overall steps involved in P-PUC∗1 are
highlighted in Algorithm 7. Before going into the details of P-PUC∗1, and to make the
presentation more clear, the new solutions to various secure primitives, which are utilized
as building blocks in P-PUC∗1, are presented. A discussion of how they are combined
together in constructing the P-PUC∗1 protocol is then presented.
1) Sum Random Shares:
The main steps involved in the Sum Random Shares protocol are given in Algorithm
1. Initially, A1 chooses a random number r from ZN (note that here N is part of A1’s public
key) and sets his/her random share as s1 = N − r. Then, A1 randomizes his/her private
input by computing z1 = a1 + r mod N and sends it to A2. For 2 ≤ i ≤ n, each consumer
Ai, upon receiving the randomized partially aggregated value zi−1 from Ai−1, adds his/her
private input by computing zi = zi−1 + ai mod N , and sends zi to Ai+1. However, the last
consumer An sends zn to C. Finally, C sets his/her random share s2 to zn. Observe that
s1 + s2 mod N = a always holds.
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Algorithm 1 Sum Random Shares(a1, . . . , an)→ (s1, s2)
Require: ai is private to Ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n; (pk, pr) = (pkA1 , prA1), where pr is known
only to A1. The consumers use a ring topology to communicate with each other.
1: A1:
(a). Pick a random number r ∈ ZN
(b). s1 ← N − r
(c). z1 ← a1 + r mod N ; send z1 to A2
2: Ai, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n do:
(a). Receive zi−1 from Ai−1
(b). zi = zi−1 + ai mod N
(c). if i = n then
• Send zi to C
else
• Send zi to Ai+1
3: C:
(a). Receive zn from An
(b). s2 ← zn
2) Secure Binary Conv:
It is assumed that C has Epk(a), where a is not known to either consumers or
C, and A1 holds the private key (i.e., (pk, pr) = (pkA1 , prA1)). The goal of the secure
binary conversion protocol is to compute the encryptions of the individual bits of binary
representation of a. That is, the output is [a] = 〈Epk(Ba[1]), . . . , Epk(Ba[m])〉, where Ba
denotes the binary representation vector of integer a with Ba[1] and Ba[m] as the most
and least significant bits of a, respectively. Here m denotes the minimum number of
bits required to represent the domain size l. Note that 1 ≤ a ≤ l and 2m−1 ≤ l <
2m. At the end, the output [a] is known only to C. The overall steps involved in the
Secure Binary Conv protocol are summarized in Algorithm 2.
To start with, C initially computes Epk(a− i) = Epk(a) ∗Epk(N − i), for 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
Note that N− i denotes “−i” under domain ZN . Then, C randomizes them by performing
homomorphic multiplications as P [i] = Epk(a− i)r¯i , where r¯i is a random number in ZN ,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Observe that P [i] = Epk(0) iff i = a. After this, C permutes the encrypted
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vector P using a random permutation function pi and sends the resulting permuted vector
P ′ to A. Upon receiving P ′, A decrypts it component-wise to get τ [i] = Dpr(P ′[i]), for
1 ≤ i ≤ l. Then, A generates a new vector u depending on vector τ as follows:
u[i] =

1 if τ [i] = 0
0 otherwise
It is emphasized that τ [i] = 0 happens exactly once since Epk(a − i) = Epk(0) occurs
exactly once, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. A encrypts u component-wise using his/her public key to get
U [i] = Epk(u[i]), for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, and sends the encrypted vector U to C. Upon receiving U ,
C performs inverse permutation on U to get V = pi−1(U). Finally, C computes [a] locally
by performing the following homomorphic operations.
• Compute encrypted matrix S, where S[i][j] = V [i]Bi[j], for 1 ≤ i ≤ l and 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Here, Bi denotes the binary representation vector of integer i with Bi[1] and Bi[m]
as the most and least significant bits of i, respectively.
• Compute the encryption of jth bit of a as Epk(Ba[j]) =
∏l
i=1 S[i][j], for 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
3) Secure Comp:
C, with private input ([a], t), and A1, with private key prA1 , are jointly involved in
the secure comparison protocol to decide whether a > t or not. The output h is revealed
only to A1, where h = 1 if a > t and 0 otherwise. The main steps involved in the
Secure Comp protocol are highlighted in Algorithm 3.
To start with, C computes the encrypted bit-wise XOR between the bits of a and
t as T [j] = Epk(Ba[j] ⊕ Bt[j]) for 1 ≤ j ≤ m using the following formulation (in general,
for any two bits x and y, the property x⊕ y = x+ y − 2xy always holds):
T [j] = Epk(Ba[j]⊕Bt[j]) = Epk(Ba[j]) ∗ Epk(Bt[j]) ∗ Epk(Ba[j] ∗Bt[j])N−2
However, since t is known to C, if Bt[j] = 0, then T [j] = Epk(Ba[j]). Whereas, if Bt[j] =
1, then T [j] = Epk(1 − Ba[j]). In general, C can easily compute Epk(Ba[j] ∗ Bt[j]) by
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Algorithm 2 Secure Binary Conv(Epk(a))→ [a]
Require: C has Epk(a), where 1 ≤ a ≤ l and 2m−1 ≤ l < 2m; (Note: The private key
pr = prA1 is known only to A1)
1: C:
(a). for i = 1 to l do:
• Epk(a− i)← Epk(a) ∗ Epk(N − i)
• P [i]← Epk(a− i)r¯i , where r¯i ∈R ZN
(b). P ′ ← pi(P ); send P ′ to A1
2: A1:
(a). Receive P ′ from C
(b). for i = 1 to l do:
• τ [i]← Dpr(P ′[i])




(c). U [i]← Epk(u[i]), for 1 ≤ i ≤ l; send U to C
3: C:
(a). Receive U from A1
(b). V ← pi−1(U)
(c). for i = 1 to l do:
• S[i][j]← V [i]Bi[j], where Bi denotes the binary representation of i and Bi[j]
denotes the jth component of vector Bi, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m




performing homomorphic multiplication as Epk(Ba[j])
Bt[j]. Observe that T [j] = Epk(1)
only if exactly one of the bits, i.e., either Ba[j] or Bt[j], is 1. After this, C performs the
following homomorphic addition and multiplication operations for 1 ≤ j ≤ m:
• Compute an encrypted vector W such that W [j] = Epk(Ba[j])1−Bt[j] = Epk(Ba[j] ∗
(1−Bt[j])). It is observed that W [j] = Epk(1) only if Ba[j] > Bt[j], otherwise W [j] =
Epk(0). In particular, W stores Epk(1) at those locations where the corresponding
bit of a is greater than that of t and Epk(0) otherwise.
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Algorithm 3 Secure Comp([a], t)→ h
Require: C has [a] and t, where 1 ≤ a, t ≤ l; (Note: The private key pr = prA1 is known
only to A1)
1: C:
(a). for j = 1 to m do:
• T [j]← Epk(Ba[j]⊕Bt[j])
• W [j]← Epk(Ba[j])1−Bt[j]
• X[j]← X[j − 1]rj ∗ T [j], where rj ∈R ZN and X[0] = Epk(0)
• Φ[j]← Epk(−1) ∗X[j]
• Y [j]← W [j] ∗ Φ[j]r′j , where r′j ∈R ZN
(b). Y ′ ← pi(Y ); send Y ′ to A1
2: A1:
(a). Receive Y ′ from C
(b). M [j]← Dpr(Y ′[j]), for 1 ≤ j ≤ m
(c). if ∃ k such that M [k] = 1 then:
• h = 1 (denoting a > t)
else
• h = 0 (denoting a ≤ t)
• Compute an encrypted vector X by preserving the first occurrence of Epk(1) (if one
exists) in T by initializing X[0] = Epk(0). The rest of the entries of X are computed
as X[j] = X[j − 1]rj ∗ T [j]. At most, one of the entries in X is Epk(1), and the
remaining entries are encryptions of either 0 or a random number. In addition, if ∃ k
such that X[k] = Epk(1), then index k is the first position (starting from the most
significant bit) at which corresponding bits of a and t differ.
• After this, C computes Φ[j] = Epk(−1)∗X[j]. From the above discussions, it is clear
that Φ[j] = Epk(0) once at most since X[j] is equal to Epk(1) once at most. Also, if
Φ[k] = Epk(0), then index k is the first position at which bits of a and t differ.
• Then, C computes an encrypted vector Y by combining W and Φ. (Note that
W [j] stores the result of Ba[j] > Bt[j] functionality.) Precisely, C computes Y [j] =
W [j] ∗ Φ[j]r′j , where r′j is a random number in ZN . The observation here is if ∃ an
index k such that Φ[k] = Epk(0) denoting the first flip in the corresponding bits of
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a and t, then W [k] stores the corresponding information, i.e., whether Ba[k] > Bt[k]
or not.
Finally C permutes Y , and sends the resulting permuted vector Y ′ to A1. Upon receiving
Y ′, A1 decrypts it component-wise to get M [j] = Dpr(Y ′[j]), for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Now,
depending on the existence of index k, A1 proceeds as follows. If there exists an index k
in M such that M [k] = 1, then Ba[k] > Bt[k] and also Ba[i] = Bt[i] = 0, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k− 1.
In this case, a > t; therefore, A1 sets the output h to 1. On the other hand, if M [k] = 0,
then a < t. However, if there exists no such index k, then t = a. In either of the last two
cases, A sets h to 0 (denoting a ≤ t).
4) Secure 2P Max:
In this protocol, consumer Ai, with the private input ([x], y), and C, with private
key pr = prC , securely compute the encryptions of the individual bits of max(x, y), i.e.,
the output is [max(x, y)]. At the end, the output [max(x, y)] is known only to Ai.
The basic idea of the proposed Secure 2P Max protocol is for Ai to randomly choose
the functionality f (by flipping a coin), where f is either x > y or y > x, and to obliviously
execute f with C using similar steps in Secure Comp protocol. Since f is randomly chosen
and known only to Ai, the output of functionality f is oblivious to C. After this, depending
on f , Ai securely computes [max(x, y)] using homomorphic properties.
The overall steps involved in the Secure 2P Max protocol are shown in Algorithm 4.
To start with, Ai initially chooses the functionality f as either x > y or x < y, randomly.
Then, depending on f , A proceeds as follows, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m:
• If f : x > y, A computes
W [j] = Epk(Bx[j]) ∗ Epk(Bx[j] ∗By[j])N−1 = Epk(Bx[j] ∗ (1−By[j]))
Γ[j] = Epk(Bx[j]−By[j]) ∗ Epk(rˆj) = Epk(Bx[j]−By[j] + rˆj)
• Otherwise,
W [j] = Epk(By[j]) ∗ Epk(Bx[j] ∗By[j])N−1 = Epk(By[j] ∗ (1−Bx[j]))
Γ[j] = Epk(By[j]−Bx[j]) ∗ Epk(rˆj) = Epk(By[j]−Bx[j] + rˆj)
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• Observe that if f : x > y, then W [j] = Epk(1) only if Bx[j] > By[j], and W [j] =
Epk(0) otherwise. Similarly, if f : y > x, then W [j] = Epk(1) only if By[j] > Bx[j],
and W [j] = Epk(0) otherwise.
Then, Ai computes the encrypted vector Y based on the similar steps as mentioned in Step
1(a) of Secure Comp (i.e., Algorithm 3). Secure Comp protocol is based on the public-
private key pair of A1 whereas the Secure 2P Max protocol utilizes the public-private key
pair of the utility company C.
After this, Ai permutes the encrypted vectors Γ and Y using two random permu-
tation functions pi1 and pi2 (known only to Ai). Specifically, Ai computes Γ
′ = pi1(Γ) and
Y ′ = pi2(Y ), and sends them to C. Upon receiving, C decrypts Y ′ component-wise to
get M [j] = Dpr(Y
′[j]), for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and checks for index k as mentioned in the Se-
cure Comp protocol. That is, if M [k] = 1, then C sets h to 1. Otherwise, C sets it to 0. In
addition, C computes a new encrypted vector M ′ such that M ′[j] = Γ′[j]h, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
and sends both M ′ and Epk(h) to Ai. After receiving M ′ and Epk(h), Ai computes the
inverse permutation of M ′ as M˜ = pi−11 (M
′). Then, Ai performs the following homomor-
phic operations to compute the encryption of jth bit of max(x, y) (i.e., Epk(Bmax(x,y)[j])),
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m:
• Remove the randomness from M˜ [j] by computing
λ[j] = M˜ [j] ∗ Epk(h)N−rˆj
• If f : x > y, then compute the jth encrypted bit as Epk(Bmax(x,y)[j])) = Epk(By[j]) ∗
λ[j]. Otherwise, compute Epk(Bmax(x,y)[j]) = Epk(Bx[j]) ∗ λ[j].
In the Secure 2P Max protocol, one main observation (upon which one can also justify the
correctness of the final output) is that if f : x > y, then Bmax(x,y)[j] = h∗x[j]+(1−h)∗y[j]
always holds for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Similarly, if f : y > x, then Bmax(x,y)[j] = h∗y[j]+(1−h)∗x[j]
always holds.
5) Secure 2P Enc Max:
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Algorithm 4 Secure 2P Max([x], y)→ [max(x, y)]
Require: Ai has ([x], y) and (pi1, pi2), where 1 ≤ x, y ≤ l and 2m−1 ≤ l < 2m; the private
key pr = prC is known only to C
1: Ai:
(a). Randomly choose the functionality f
(b). for j = 1 to m do:
• if f : x > y then:
– W [j]← Epk(Bx[j]) ∗ Epk(Bx[j] ∗By[j])N−1
– Γ[j]← Epk(Bx[j]−By[j]) ∗ Epk(rˆj), where rˆj ∈R ZN
else
– W [j]← Epk(By[j]) ∗ Epk(Bx[j] ∗By[j])N−1
– Γ[j]← Epk(By[j]−Bx[j]) ∗ Epk(rˆj), where rˆj ∈R ZN
• T [j]← Epk(Bx[j]⊕By[j])
• X[j]← X[j − 1]rj ∗ T [j], where rj ∈R ZN and X[0] = Epk(0)
• Φ[j]← Epk(−1) ∗X[j]
• Y [j]← W [j] ∗ Φ[j]r′j , where r′j ∈R ZN
(c). Γ′ ← pi1(Γ)
(d). Y ′ ← pi2(Y ); send Γ′ and Y ′ to C
2: C:
(a). Receive Γ′ and Y ′ from A1
(b). Decryption, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m do: M [j]← Dpr(Y ′[j])
(c). if ∃ k such that M [k] = 1 then: h← 1
else h← 0
(d). for 1 ≤ j ≤ m do: M ′[j]← Γ′[j]h
(e). Send M ′ and Epk(h) to A1
3: Ai:
(a). Receive M ′ and Epk(h) from C
(b). M˜ ← pi−11 (M ′)
(c). for j = 1 to m do:
• λ[j]← M˜ [j] ∗ Epk(h)N−rˆj
• if f : x > y then: Epk(Bmax(x,y)[j])← Epk(By[j]) ∗ λ[j]
else Epk(Bmax(x,y)[j])← Epk(Bx[j]) ∗ λ[j]
In this protocol, it is assumed that both x and y are unknown to Ai and C (whereas
in Secure 2P Max y is known to Ai). More specifically, Ai with private input ([x], [y])
and C securely compute [max(x, y)]. The main steps involved in Secure 2P Enc Max are
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Algorithm 5 Secure 2P Enc Max([x], [y])→ [max(x, y)]
Require: Ai has [x] and [y], where 1 ≤ x, y ≤ l and 2m−1 ≤ l < 2m; the private key
pr = prC is known only to C
1: Ai:
(a). for j = 1 to m do:
• X ′[j]← Epk(Bx[j]) ∗ Epk(rx,j), where rx,j ∈R ZN
• Y ′[j]← Epk(By[j]) ∗ Epk(ry,j), where ry,j ∈R ZN
(b). Send X ′ and Y ′ to C
2: C:
(a). for j = 1 to m do:
• x′[j]← Dpr(X ′[j])
• y′[j]← Dpr(Y ′[j])
• ω[j]← x′[j] ∗ y′[j] mod N
• Compute Ω[j]← Epk(ω[j])
(b). Send Ω to Ai
3: Ai:
(a). Receive Ω from C
(b). for j = 1 to m do:
• χ[j]← Epk(Bx[j])ry,j ∗ Epk(By[j])rx,j
• χ′[j]← χ[j] ∗ Epk(rx,j ∗ ry,j)
• Epk(Bx[j] ∗By[j])← Ω[j] ∗ χ′[j]N−1
4: Ai and C proceed with steps 1-3 of Algorithm 4
shown in Algorithm 5. The basic idea used in Secure 2P Enc Max is the same as in
Secure 2P Max protocol. However, since both x and y are unknown, one cannot directly
compute Epk(Bx[j] ∗ By[j]), which is required for the computation of W [j] and T [j], for
1 ≤ j ≤ m. Other than this, the rest of steps are pretty much the same as in Algorithm
4. Therefore, the steps involved in securely computing Epk(Bx[j] ∗ By[j]), for 1 ≤ j ≤ m
are provided here.
Initially, Ai randomizes [x] and [y] component-wise to compute X
′[j] = Epk(Bx[j]+
rx,j) and Y
′[j] = Epk(By[j] + ry,j), for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, where rx,j, ry,j ∈R ZN . Then, A sends
X ′ and Y ′ to C. Upon receiving, C decrypts and multiplies them component-wise and
proceeds as follows for 1 ≤ j ≤ m:
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• Compute ω[j] = x′[j] ∗ y′[j] mod N , where
x′[j] = Dpr(X ′[j]) and y′[j] = Dpr(Y ′[j]);
• Encrypt the result: Ω[j] = Epk(ω[j]).
After this, C sends Ω to Ai. Then, Ai performs the following homomorphic operations to
compute Epk(Bx[j] ∗By[j]) by removing extra random factors, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m:
• χ[j] = Epk(Bx[j])ry,j ∗ Epk(By[j])rx,j . Observe that, due to homomorphic properties,
χ[j] = Epk(Bx[j] ∗ ry,j +By[j] ∗ rx,j).
• Compute χ′[j] = χ[j] ∗ Epk(rx,j ∗ ry,j).
• Finally, compute Epk(Bx[j] ∗By[j]) as Ω[j] ∗ χ′[j]N−1.
Once Ai knows Epk(Bx[j] ∗ By[j]), for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, he/she can compute Y locally, as
mentioned in Algorithm 4. In addition, with the help of C, Ai can obliviously compute
[max(x, y)]. That is, Ai and C are involved in steps 1-3 of Algorithm 4 to obliviously
compute [max(x, y)].
6) Secure MP Max:
In this protocol, we consider n parties such that party Ai holds private input ai,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The goal of the secure multi-party computation of maximum (denoted by
Secure MP Max) is to compute [max(a1, . . . , an)] = [amax] in a privacy-preserving manner.
Our protocol utilizes two sub-routines, namely Secure 2P Max and Secure 2P Enc Max as
the building blocks. The proposed Secure MP Max protocol is an iterative approach, and
it computes the desired output in a hierarchical fashion. In each iteration, the maximum
between a pair of values is computed and fed as input to the next iteration. Therefore,
a binary execution tree is generated in a bottom-up fashion, where leaf node i represents
party Ai holding his/her private input ai. The root node is A1 holding the final result
[amax], which is broadcasted to other parties (i.e., Ai’s, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n). Hence, at the end
of the Secure MP Max protocol, the output [amax] is known to all Ai’s, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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Algorithm 6 Secure MP Max(a1, . . . , an)→ [amax]
Require: ai is private to Ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n; (Note: pr = prC is known only to C)
1: num← n
2: for k = 1 to dlog2 ne:




• if k = 1 then:
– A2i sends [a2i] to A2(i−1)+1, where a2i is the private input of A2i
– A2(i−1)+1 and C are jointly involved in Secure 2P Max([a2i], a2(i−1)+1),
where a2(i−1)+1 is the private input of A2(i−1)+1
else
– A2ki−1 sends [xk,i] to A2k(i−1)+1, where [xk,i] is the output received by
A2ki−1 from iteration k − 1
– A2k(i−1)+1 and C are jointly involved in the Secure 2P Enc Max
([xk,i], [yk,i]), where [yk,i] is the output received by the party A2k(i−1)+1





(a.) Send [amax] to Ai, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n
The main steps involved in the Secure MP Max protocol are highlighted in Algo-
rithm 6. Initially, each party of Ai assigns n to the global variable num, where num
represents the number of parties involved in each iteration. Since the Secure MP Max
protocol executes in a binary tree hierarchy (bottom-up fashion), we have dlog2 ne itera-
tions, and the number of involved parties varies in each iteration. In the first iteration











). More specifically, A2
sends [a2] to A1, A4 sends [a4] to A3, and so on. After this, A2(i−1)+1 and C are involved





, where a2(i−1)+1 is the pri-
vate input of A2(i−1)+1. As mentioned earlier, at the end of the Secure 2P Max protocol,
only the party A2(i−1)+1 receives [max(a2i, a2(i−1)+1)], and nothing is revealed to C, for
1 ≤ i ≤ ⌊num
2
⌋






During the kth iteration, only the parties who received the output from the previous
iteration are involved, for 2 ≤ k ≤ dlog2 ne. For example, during the second iteration (i.e.,
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k = 2), only A1, A3, and so on are involved. In k
th iteration, A2ki−1 sends [xk,i] to A2k(i−1)+1,






Upon receiving, A2k(i−1)+1 and C are involved in the Secure 2P Enc Max([xk,i], [yk,i]) proto-











. We observe that [xk,i] and [yk,i]
are the maximum values retrieved from the sub-trees rooted at A2ki−1 and A2k(i−1)+1 (in
iteration k), respectively, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ⌊num
2
⌋
and 2 ≤ k ≤ dlog2 ne.
At the end of the last iteration (i.e., k = dlog2 ne), only A1 receives [amax], which is
forwarded to Ai, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
Example: Without loss of generality, consider 5 households in a neighborhood (i.e.,
n = 5). Then, in the Secure MP Max protocol, num is initially set to 5 and we have
3 iterations (i.e., k runs from 1 to 3). Various intermediate steps of executing the Se-
cure MP Max protocol are summarized:
(i). k = 1
• A2 sends [a2] to A1. Then, A1, with private input ([a2], a1) , and C are involved
in Secure 2P Max. At the end of this step, A1 knows [max(a1, a2)].
• A4 sends [a4] to A3. After this, A3 computes [max(a3, a4)] by executing Se-
cure 2P Max with C. Note that A5 does not participate in this iteration.




(ii). k = 2
• A3 sends [max(a3, a4)] to A1. Then, A1, with private input ([max(a3, a4)],
[max(a1, a2)]), and C are jointly involved in Secure 2P Enc Max. At the end
of this step, A1 gets [max(a1, . . . , a4)]. Observe that A5 does not participate in
this iteration.
• num = 2
(iii). k = 3
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• A5 sends [a5] to A1. Now, A1, with private input ([a5], [max(a1, . . . , a4)]), and
C are involved in Secure 2P Enc Max to compute [max(a1, . . . , a5)].
• num = 1
At the end of the third iteration, the final output [amax] = [max(a1, . . . , a5)] is known only
to A1 and forwarded to other parties. 
7) P-PUC∗1:
We now discuss how the above security primitives are used in constructing the
proposed P-PUC∗1 protocol. The main steps involved in P-PUC
∗
1 are shown in Algorithm
7.
To start with, the n consumers and the utility company C are initially involved
in the Sum Random Shares sub-routine to compute the random shares of a (step 1 of
Algorithm 7). Then, A1 encrypts his/her random share s1 (using pk = pkA1) and sends it
to C. Upon receiving, C computes Epk(a) using his/her random share s2 by computing
Epk(s1) ∗ Epk(s2) = Epk(s1 + s2 mod N) = Epk(a). Note that s1 + s2 mod N is always
equal to a. After this, C, with private input Epk(a), and consumer A1 are involved in the
Secure Binary Conv protocol (step 2(c) of Algorithm 7). At the end of this step, only C
knows [a]. Then, C, with private input ([a], t), and A1 engage involve in the Secure Comp
protocol to securely compare a and t. At the end, the output h (denoting whether a > t
or not) is revealed only to A1 and forwarded to other consumers (step 3(a) of of Algorithm
7). It is important to note that all consumers will know whether a > t or not, but
this information is expected to be revealed to the consumers by design; therefore, it is
considered to be acceptable.
If a > t (i.e., h = 1), then the consumers, with their respective private inputs ai’s,
and C, with private key prC (i.e., (pk, pr) = (pkC , prC)), engage in the Secure MP Max
protocol to securely compute [amax] (step 4(a) of Algorithm 7). At the end of this step,
the output [amax] is revealed to all consumers. After this, each Ai independently checks
whether the maximum value belongs to him/her (i.e., whether ai = amax or not ) in an
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Algorithm 7 P-PUC∗1
Require: ai is private to Ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n (Note: prC and t are known only to C, prA1
is known only to A1; pkC and pkA1 are public)
1: {For steps 1 & 2 (pk, pr) = (pkA1 , prA1)}
2: Sum Random Shares(a1, . . . , an)
3: A1 and C:
(a). A1 sends Epk(s1) to C
(b). C computes Epk(a)← Epk(s1) ∗ Epk(s2)
(c). A1 and C are involved in the secure comparison protocol:
• [a]← Secure Binary Conv(Epk(a)), here the output [a] is revealed only to C
• h← Secure Comp([a], t), here the output h is revealed only to A1
4: A1:
(a). Send h to Ai, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n
{For step 4 (pk, pr) = (pkC , prC)}
5: if h = 1 (denoting a > t) then:
(a). [amax]← Secure MP Max(a1, . . . , an)
(b). Ai, for i = 1 to n do:
• αi ← Secure Equality(ai, [amax])
• if αi = 1 (denoting ai = amax) then:
– Reduce ai
6: Repeat the steps until a ≤ t
oblivious manner with C by using the Secure Equality protocol (step 4(b) of Algorithm
7), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We adopt Secure Equality protocol steps shown below:
1. Initially, Ai computes Z[i] = Epk(r
′
i ∗ (amax − ai)), where r′i ∈R ZN , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
After this, Ai sends Z[i] to A1, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
2. A1 randomly permutes Z using a random permutation function pi, i.e., he/she com-
putes Z1 = pi(Z) and sends Z1 to C.
3. Then, C decrypts each entry in Z1 and computes a new vector H as follows. If
Dpr(Z1[i]) = 0, then H[i] = Epk(1). Else, H[i] = Epk(0). C sends H to A1.
4. A1 computes the inverse permutation on H to get L = pi
−1(H) and sends L[i] to Ai,
for 2 ≤ i ≤ n. Observe that L[i] = Epk(1) iff ai = amax. Otherwise, Epk(0).
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5. Now Ai proceeds as follows, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
• Randomizes L[i] by computing L′[i] = L[i] ∗Epk(ri), where ri ∈R ZN , and sends
L′[i] to C.
• Upon receiving L′[i], C decrypts it to get βi = Dpr(L′[i]) and sends the result to
Ai.
• Finally, Ai removes the randomization and gets his/her result as αi = βi − ri
mod N .
Note that since L[i] = Epk(1) iff ai = amax, the output αi = 1 always holds. Similarly, if
ai 6= amax, then αi = 0 always holds.
At the end of the Secure Equality protocol, each party knows whether his/her
private input is the maximum value. After this, only the self-identified consumer (i.e., for
which amax = ai) reduces his/her power usage accordingly. The process is repeated by
computing the new random shares of updated a in each iteration until a ≤ t.
5.1.2. The P-PUC∗2 Protocol. The second protocol, denoted as P-PUC
∗
2, is
based on Strategy 2 as mentioned in Section 1.1.. The basic idea of P-PUC∗2 is to se-
curely compute t
a
using a secure division protocol whenever a > t. Once consumers know
the value of t
a
, they will reduce their power consumption locally as mentioned in Strategy
2. Since the existing division protocols are inefficient, we present a new solution to the
two-party secure division problem (denoted by Secure Div).
1) Secure Div:
In the proposed Secure Div protocol, the utility company C, with private input
(Epk(a), t), and A1, with private key pr = prA1 , are involved (two-party computation).
The goal of the Secure Div protocol is to compute t
a
such that t and a are not revealed to
A1 and a is not revealed to C. This implies that the output
t
a
is revealed only to A1 and
forwarded to Ai’s, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n. We emphasize that the output should not be revealed
to C because C can easily infer a from t
a
as t is already known to C. The overall steps
involved in the proposed Secure Div protocol are given in Algorithm 8.
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Algorithm 8 Secure Div(Epk(a), t)→ ta
Require: C has (Epk(a), t), where 1 ≤ a, t ≤ l, and θ is a scalar factor assumed to be
public; (Note: Here (pk, pr) = (pkA1 , prA1) and prA1 is known only to A1)
1: C:
(a). for i = 1 to l do:
• Epk(a− i)← Epk(a) ∗ Epk(N − i)
• P [i]← Epk(a− i)r¯i , where r¯i ∈R ZN
• Q[i]← ⌈θ ∗ t
i
⌉
(b). P ′ ← pi(P ); send P ′ to A1
2: A1:
(a). Receive P ′ from C
(b). for i = 1 to l do:
• τ [i]← Dpr(P ′[i])




(c). U [i]← Epk(u[i]), for 1 ≤ i ≤ l; send U to C
3: C:
(a). Receive U from C
(b). V ← pi−1(U)
(c). γ ←∏li=1 V [i]Q[i]; send γ to A1
4: A1:







to Ai, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n
To start with, C initially computes Epk(a − i) and randomizes it by computing
P [i] = Epk(a− i)r¯i = Epk(r¯i ∗ (a− i)), where r¯i is a random number in ZN , for 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
Note that exactly one of the entries in P is an encryption of 0, namely P [a] = Epk(0).





, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, where θ
is a scalar factor that is treated as public information. It is emphasized that θ acts as a
precision parameter in computing t
a
. Then, C permutes P using a random permutation
function pi (known only to C) and sends the resulting encrypted vector P ′ to A1. Upon
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Algorithm 9 P-PUC∗2
Require: ai is private to Ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n (Note: prC and t are known only to C, prA1
is known only to A1, pkC and pkA1 are public)
Steps 1 - 3 are the same as in Algorithm 7
4. if a > t then:
(a). A1 and C:
• Secure Div(Epk(a), t) (note that the output ta is revealed only to Ai’s)
(b). Ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n do:
• δi ← ai ∗ (1− ta)
• Reduce ai using δi
receiving P ′, A1 decrypts it component-wise to get τ [i] = Dpr(P ′[i]). After this, he/she
computes a vector u based on τ such that u[i] = 1 if τ [i] = 0, and u[i] = 0 otherwise,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Then A1 encrypts u component-wise to get U , i.e., U [i] = Epk(u[i]), for
1 ≤ i ≤ l, and sends U to C.




Q[i]. After this, C sends γ to A1. Finally, A1 decrypts γ and divides the
result by the scalar factor θ to get t
a
(step 4(b) of Algorithm 8). Furthermore, A1 sends




Since the proposed P-PUC∗2 protocol is based on Strategy 2, it is non-iterative
(whereas P-PUC∗1 is iterative). The main steps involved in P-PUC
∗
2 are shown in Algorithm
9. The first three steps are the same as in the P-PUC∗1 protocol. Similar to P-PUC
∗
1, at the
end of Step 3, all consumers know the output of the Secure Comp protocol, i.e., whether
a > t or not.
Whenever a > t, C, with private input (Epk(a), t), and A1 engage in the Secure Div
protocol (Step 4(a) of Algorithm 9). We observe that some of the computations performed
in the Secure Binary Conv protocol can be re-used in the Secure Div protocol. This is
because the encrypted vector V that needs to be computed in the Secure Div protocol
is the same as in Secure Binary Conv. Therefore, during the actual implementation of
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Secure Div, C can directly proceed to Step 3(c) to compute γ using V , which was al-
ready computed in the Secure Binary Conv protocol. Therefore, the overall computation
complexity of P-PUC∗1 is reduced.
At the end of the Secure Div protocol, each consumer knows the value of t
a
. We
emphasize that during this process, neither the value of t nor a is revealed to the consumers.
In addition, a is not revealed to C. After this, each consumer Ai performs the following
operations, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
• Compute δi, the least amount of power to be reduced, as ai ∗ (1 − ta). Note that,
since a > t, we always have 0 < t
a
< 1.
• Finally, Ai reduces his/her power usage based on δi.
5.2. SECURITY ANALYSIS
To prove a protocol’s security under the semi-honest model, we adopted the well-
known security definitions from the literature of secure multi-party computation (MPC).
First of all, since the Secure 2P Max protocol is more complex than other sub-protocols,
we are motivated to provide its security proof rather than providing proofs for each sub-
protocol. Therefore, we only include a formal security proof for the Secure 2P Max proto-
col based on the standard simulation argument [64]. Nevertheless, we stress that similar
proof strategies can be used to show that other sub-protocols are secure under the semi-
honest model. We now provide a formal security proof for Secure 2P Max under the
semi-honest model.
As mentioned in Section 3.2.1., to formally prove that Secure 2P Max is secure
[64] under the semi-honest model, we need to show that the simulated execution image
of Secure 2P Max is computationally indistinguishable from the actual execution image
of Secure 2P Max. An execution image generally includes the messages exchanged and
the information computed from these messages. Therefore, according to Algorithm 4, the
execution image of C can be denoted by ΠC , where
ΠC = {〈Γ′[j], µ[j] + rˆj mod N〉, 〈Y ′[j], h〉 | for 1 ≤ j ≤ m}
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Observe that µ[j] + rˆj mod N is derived upon decrypting Γ
′[j], where the modulo
operator is implicit in the decryption function. Also, C receives Y ′ from A1. Let h denote
the (oblivious) comparison result computed from Y ′. Without loss of generality, suppose
the simulated image of C be ΠSC , where
ΠSC = {〈s1[j], s2[j]〉, 〈s3[j], h′〉 | for 1 ≤ j ≤ m}
Here s1[j] and s3[j] are randomly generated from ZN2 , and s2[j] is randomly generated
from ZN . In addition, h′ is a random bit. Since Epk is a semantically secure encryption
scheme with resulting ciphertext size less than N2, Γ′[j] and Y ′[j] are computationally
indistinguishable from s1[j] and s3[j]. Also, as rˆj is randomly generated, µ[j] + rˆj mod N
is computationally indistinguishable from s2[j]. Furthermore, because the functionality
is randomly chosen by A1 (at step 1(a) of Algorithm 4), h is either 0 or 1 with equal
probability. Thus, h is computationally indistinguishable from h′. Combining all these
results allows us to conclude that ΠC is computationally indistinguishable from Π
S
C . This
implies that, during the execution of Secure 2P Max, C does not learn anything about x,
y, and the actual comparison result. Intuitively speaking, the information P2 has during
an execution of Secure 2P Max is either random or pseudo-random, so this information
does not disclose anything regarding x and y. Additionally, as f is known only to A1, the
actual comparison result is oblivious to C.
On the other hand, the execution image of A1, denoted by ΠA1 , is given by
ΠA1 = {M ′[j], Epk(h) | for 1 ≤ j ≤ m}
Here, M ′[j] is an encrypted value, which is random in ZN2 , received from C (at Step 3(a)




ΠSA1 = {s4[j], b | for 1 ≤ i ≤ m}
Both s4[j] and b are randomly generated from ZN2 . Since Epk is a semantic se-
cure encryption scheme with resulting ciphertext size less than N2, M ′[j] and Epk(h) are
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computationally indistinguishable from s4[j] and b. Therefore, ΠA1 is computationally
indistinguishable from ΠSA1 . This implies that A1 does not learn anything about the com-
parison result or x. We can say Secure 2P Max is secure under the semi-honest model
when combined with the previous analysis. In a similar way, we can formally prove that
all our sub-protocols are secure under the semi-honest model.
Based on the previous discussions, it is clear that the intermediate values in each
of the proposed sub-protocols are either random or pseudo-random. Therefore, no infor-
mation is revealed to the involved parties other than the expected output. Additionally,
in the proposed P-PUC protocols, the output of a sub-protocol fed as an input to the next
sub-protocol. Therefore, the sub-protocols are independent from one another, but they are
the building blocks for the proposed P-PUC protocols. In addition, to maximize security
protection, it is emphasized that the outputs in all our sub-protocols are either random or
pseudo-random values. For example, the output of Secure Binary Conv, which is an en-
crypted value Epk(a), is passed as an input to the Secure Comp protocol. Therefore, based
on the well-known Composition Theorem [64], we claim that a sequential composition of
the sub-protocols leads to our new proposed P-PUC protocols that are secure under the
semi-honest model.
5.3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we first empirically analyze the computation costs of the proposed
protocols based on different parameters. Then, we compare the computation costs of the
protocols in Chapter 4. with our new proposed protocols in this chapter. We emphasize
that P-PUC1 and P-PUC2 are not fully secure.
The protocols were implemented in C using the Paillier encryption scheme [65].
All experiments were conducted on a Linux machine running Ubuntu 10.04 LTS with
Intel R© Xeon R© Six-CoreTM 3.07GHz and 12GB RAM. For the rest of this section, we fix
the Paillier encryption key size K to 1024 bits (for both C and A1) since it is the commonly
used key size in practice (Under the Paillier cryptosystem, a 1024-bit encryption key results
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in 2048-bit ciphertexts, which are sufficiently secure for most applications). Nevertheless,
we observed that for any given fixed parameters, the computation costs of the proposed
protocols are increased by a factor of nearly 7 whenever K is doubled. In our experiments,
we randomly generate the values of ai’s and t such that a > t and 1 ≤ a, t ≤ l, where l is
the domain size.
5.3.1. Performance of P-PUC∗1 and P-PUC
∗
2. We first compute the compu-
tation costs of different parties involved in the P-PUC∗1 protocol for n = 50 and varying
values of l. That is, the running times of A1, C, and Ai, where i 6= 1, are analyzed for
one iteration. Note that the costs of individual parties in P-PUC∗1 do not vary between
iterations for any given fixed parameters (assuming a > t holds under different iterations).
Therefore, we present the computation costs of the individual parties in a given iteration.
Since the computation costs of Ai’s are different, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n, we present the average
cost for Ai. As shown in Figure 5.1.(a), the computation costs of A1, C, and Ai are 7.78,
4.32, and 3.17 seconds, respectively, for l = 1000. As expected, the computation times of
every involved parties increase with l, but the trend of computation times increasing for
Ai is very small. For example, the computation time of A1 increases from 7.78 to 27.37
seconds while that of C increases from 4.32 to 14.91 seconds when l is changed from 1000
to 5000. However, the cost of Ai increases slightly from 3.17 to 4.18 seconds when l is
changed from 1000 to 5000. The high computation costs of A1 and C come from two
sub-protocols, namely Secure Binary Conv and Secure MP Max. We emphasize that Ai
does not participate in the Secure Binary Conv protocol. Also, not all Ai’s participate
in the Secure MP Max protocol; therefore, resulting in small computation costs for Ai’s,
where 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
In a similar manner, the computation costs of A1 and C in the P-PUC
∗
2 protocol
are analyzed for varying l with n = 50 and θ = 100, where θ is the scalar factor (note that
the computation time of P-PUC∗2 is independent of θ). The computation costs of different
parties in P-PUC∗2 are as shown in Figure 5.1.(b). We emphasize that the computation costs
of Ai’s in P-PUC
∗
2 are negligible since they do not participate in any of the corresponding
sub-protocols. On the other hand, for l = 1000, the computation costs of A1 and C are
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9.21 and 5.65 seconds, respectively. We observe that the costs (i.e., both computation and
communication) of A1 and C grow linearly with l. For example, the computation time
of A1 increases from 9.21 to 46.19 seconds when l is varied from 1000 to 5000 (i.e., the
computation time increases by a factor of nearly 5). In addition, the computation cost of
C increases from 5.65 to 25.34 seconds when l is changed from 1000 to 5000, resulting in
a similar trend.
We now compare the total computation costs of P-PUC∗1 (for one iteration) and
P-PUC∗2 for l = 1000 and varying n, where n denotes the number of households from a
given neighborhood. As shown in Figure 5.1.(c), the total running time of P-PUC∗1 varies
from 12.12 to 19.3 seconds when n is changed from 50 to 250. On the other hand, the
total running time of P-PUC∗2 remains around 14.9 seconds since it is independent of n.
Following from Figure 5.1.(c), P-PUC∗1 works better than P-PUC
∗
2 when the neighborhood
size is below 100. After 100, P-PUC∗2 gives a better performance.
In general, the power usage control process is performed once every 30 minutes.
Therefore, based on the above results, we conclude that the proposed protocols are very
practical. Besides practicality, the main advantage of the proposed protocols is that they
execute the entire TPUC process in a privacy-preserving manner. In addition, following
from our empirical analysis, P-PUC∗1 and P-PUC
∗
2 provide similar performance in small
neighborhood. When the neighborhood size is greater than 100, P-PUC∗2 is more steady
and efficient than P-PUC∗1.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported in 2010 that the av-
erage electricity consumption for an American household was 958 kWh per month, i.e.,
roughly 32 kWh per day or 2 kWh per hour [76]. Assuming the power consumption data
is collected (in encrypted form) every 30 minutes, the aggregated value a will always be
less than 5000, even for a neighborhood of 500 households. Therefore, under our problem
domain, l = 5000 is sufficient in satisfying the requirement of 1 ≤ a ≤ l.
5.3.2. Performance Comparison with P-PUC1 and P-PUC2. Finally, we
compare the computation costs of the protocols here with the protocols in Chapter 4.. For




























































(c) Complexity: P-PUC∗1 Vs. P-PUC
∗
2
Figure 5.1. Empirical results of P-PUC∗1 and P-PUC
∗
2 based on Paillier cryptosystem for
K =1024.
than P-PUC∗1. For example, when n = 50 and l = 1000, P-PUC
∗
1 takes 12.12 seconds (i.e,
P-PUC1 is 6 times more efficient than P-PUC
∗
1). Nevertheless, this efficiency gain comes




On the other hand, the computation cost of P-PUC2 is roughly around 50 hours
for n = 50 because the existing secure division protocol [75] utilized in P-PUC2 is very
inefficient. More specifically, a single execution of the secure division protocol [75] took
around an hour, and we need to execute it n number of times in P-PUC2. Hence, P-PUC
∗
2
is significantly more efficient than P-PUC2. In particular, for n = 50 and l = 1000, P-PUC
∗
2
(which takes 12.12 seconds) is around 14851 times more efficient than P-PUC2.
In summary, P-PUC∗1 is more secure but less efficient than P-PUC1. However,
P-PUC∗2 is more secure as well as efficient when compared to P-PUC2.
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6. OUTSOURCEABLE PRIVACY-PRESERVING POWER USAGE
CONTROL
In Outsourceable Privacy-Preserving Power Usage Control in a Smart Grid [15], we
develop an efficient OP-PUC protocol that incurs almost no computations on the house-
holds, since the computations are completely outsourced to the cloud servers. Details will
be provided in this chapter. The proposed protocol is secure under the semi-honest model
and satisfies all the security requirements discussed in Section 1.1.2.. Due to the fact that
all computations are outsourced to the cloud servers and are only performed on encrypted
data, the existing P-PUC protocols cannot be applied to this problem setting. In addition,
the proposed protocol is more efficient because it takes advantage of both secret sharing
based secure computation and Yao’s garbled circuit [69]. The proposed protocol consists of
three stages: (1) collecting and integrating data, (2) comparing a and t, and (3) computing
the δi values. At the first stage, the two cloud servers collect the average power consump-
tion data ai from each household Ai and the threshold value t from the utility company.
This stage utilizes additive secret sharing, which is extremely efficient, to securely com-
bine the data together to generate secret shares of the total power consumption a of the
neighborhood. The second stage determines the comparison result between a and t. The
third stage computes the δ values using the garbled circuit. The key functionality involved
in this stage is secure division. The existing secure division protocols are very inefficient,
and our work provides a new and more efficient implementation of secure division. Details
regarding our proposed protocol are given in Section 6.1..
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.1. provides the detailed
implementation of the proposed OP-PUC protocol, and Section 6.2. presents empirical
results to show the practicality of OP-PUC.
6.1. OUTSOURCEABLE PRIVACY-PRESERVING POWER USAGE CON-
TROL PROTOCOLS
In this section, the same notations from the previous chapters, summarized in Table
3.1., are adopted. As shown in Section 1.1., the proposed OP-PUC protocol adopts the
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following two power usage control strategies when a > t: (1) reducing the power usage for
the user who uses the maximum amount of energy among all users, and (2) providing the
specific power reduction amount for each individual user in a particular neighborhood.
6.1.1. The First Stage of OP-PUC. In this problem setting, the protocol is
executed by two cloud servers. First, the cloud servers need to gather the necessary data
from power customers and the utility company. Then, the cloud servers must compare the
total power consumption of those customers a with the threshold given by utility company
t. If a > t, users need to reduce their power usage for the next period. The first stage of
OP-PUC is data collection.
During the first stage, data must be hidden before it is outsourced. In the previous
P-PUC protocols, homomorphic encryptions were utilized to encrypt the power usage
data. However, if the homomorphic encryption approach is extended to this outsourced
environment, huge computations would be incurred on the cloud servers. For example, in
previous P-PUC protocols the coordinator (party that is in duty of computation) deals
with one input of cypher-text and one input of plain-text algorithm, whereas remote server
(counterpart of coordinator) in the new OP-PUC protocols need to deal with two cypher-
text inputs. When this algorithm has multiplications of inputs involved, there are far more
computation costs for the second algorithm than the first one. This is not applicable in
our case. Therefore, to have a more efficient protocol, a secret sharing approach is adopted
for the data collection stage.
To get shared inputs, the Secure Split protocol presented in Algorithm 10, where
N is assumed to be a large number, is used. In this protocol, A splits its input value α to
two random values α′ and α′′, so that α′ + α′′ = α mod N , and sends them to S1 and S2,
respectively. At the end, S1 holds α
′ and S2 holds α′′. They do not know anything about
α except for N .
Algorithm 11 gives the main steps for the data collection stage of OP-PUC. For




i and sent to servers S1
and S2 using Secure Split. At the same time, the utility company C also uses Secure Split
to send the secret shares of t to the two cloud servers. At the end, S1 and S2 compute
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Algorithm 10 Secure Split(α)→ (α′, α′′)
Require: A has α and N where α < N
1: A:
(a) α′ ← α + r mod N , where r ∈R ZN
(b) α′′ ← N − r
(c) Send α′ to S1 and send α′′ to S2
2: S1 and S2:
(a) Receive α′ and α′′ respectively
Algorithm 11 Data Collection→ {(a′1, a′′1), . . . , (a′n, a′′n), (a′, a′′), (t′, t′′)}
Require: Ai has ai where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, C has t, and N is publicly known
1: Ai: Secure Split(ai)






















i separately. It is easy to see a = a
′+a′′ mod N is the total
power usage at a specific period. Since each server has one secret share of each value, they
do not know anything about the original values.
6.1.2. The Second Stage of OP-PUC. The main task for the second stage of
the proposed protocol is to securely determine whether a > t or not; thus, a secure compar-
ison protocol is needed to compare a and t with secret shares of each value as inputs. Use of
a garbled circuit to securely perform the comparison task is considered because the existing
secure comparison protocols [77, 78, 79, 80, 81] are not directly applicable in this problem
domain. These protocols require that the inputs are the actual values. In addition, the
garbled circuit is known for its efficiency in securely evaluating simple functionalities such
as secure comparison. A garbled circuit has only one round of communication. Details
about constructing and evaluating a garbled circuit are given in Faster secure two party
computation using garbled circuits [82]. In this paper, it is assumed that the secure compar-
ison protocol built by a garbled circuit is denoted by Secure Comparison(a′, a′′, t′, t′′)→ b.
The protocol is performed by S1 and S2, where a
′ and t′ are the inputs of S1, and a′′ and t′′
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Algorithm 12 Secure Maximum{(a′1, a′′1), ..., (a′n, a′′n)} → (amax′, amax′′)
Require: A has a′1, ..., a
′




n, N is public




i mod N for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
2: num← n
3: for k = 1 to log2 n:
(a) for 1 ≤ i ≤ num/2:
• a2k(i−1)+1 ←Secure Maxof2(a2k(i−1)+1, a2ki)
(b) num← num/2
are the inputs of S2. The protocol returns a bit b to the servers. If b = 1, the total power
usage exceeds the threshold, and the OP-PUC protocol will proceed to the next stage.
6.1.3. The Third Stage of OP-PUC Based on Strategy 1. For Strategy 1,
the user with the highest power consumption is selected and ordered to reduce his power
usage. During the process, the cloud servers are not allowed to know which user has been
chosen. Basically, in this stage, a Secure Maximum protocol is used to securely pick out
the maximum value among n shared values. The garbled circuit approach is utilized to
implement Secure Maximum.
To implement Secure Maximum, the protocol Secure Maxof2(a, b) is easy to derive
from a simple Secure Comparison protocol introduced in the last subsection. That is,
firstly compute a comparison between those two values, then use the result (either 0 or 1)
to multiply the first value, plus the multiplication of the second value and reverse of the
result. Explicitly, to judge the maximum of value a and b, firstly we compare those two
and get the 1-bit result c. After this we can compute max(a, b) = c× a+ c× b.
For maximum among multiple values, the protocol becomes an iterative approach
to compute maximum number in a hierarchical fashion. In each loop, maximum between
two values is computed and are treat as input to the next iteration. Algorithm 12 gives a
thought of how to compute Secure Maximum. We emphasis that this algorithm could be
paralleled performed such that it should be more efficient under more servers settings.
At the end, the maximum value is known by each user. The user with the maximum
energy consumption reduces his or her power consumption. As stated in the existing work,
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the amount by which the energy consumption needs to be reduced is hard to decide. Thus,
the second strategy is more practical.
6.1.4. The Third Stage of OP-PUC Based on Strategy 2. When the total
energy consumption exceeds the threshold t, each user needs to reduce his or her power
usage. Deciding a reasonable power reduction amount for everybody is really important.
The function from the prior work, which is shown in Equation 1 is adopted here. Using this
equation, every user Ai will reduce at least δi power, which is decided by ai and weighted
in a. Since party Ai has its own power consumption value ai,
t
a
needs to be calculated at
the servers.
To securely compute t
a
, two secure division protocols that use additive homomor-
phic encryption schemes are introduced in [14, 83]. However, a garbled circuit approach
should be more efficient. The reason is that in the outsourced environment, inputs to the
secure protocols are hidden from the cloud servers. Thus, it is not easy to extend the
prior solutions to fit this problem domain. In particular, when both t and a are hidden,
computing division between two encrypted values under homomorphic encryption is very
expensive. In the garbled circuit approach, the secret shares of t and a can be directly
used as inputs to the circuits.
The division circuit was built based on the “shift and subtract” non-restoring
method. Algorithm 13 gives a detail of this method. In general, to calculate the quo-
tient of l-bit number t and m-bit number a, one must first expand t with m + 1 bits and
perform an iterative algorithm. In each loop, t makes a left shift and a is subtracted or
added from the lth bit to the (l+m− 1)th bit based on the value of tl+m: if tl+m = 0, then
subtraction is performed. Otherwise, addition is performed. After m rounds, the latest t0
to tl−1 store the quotient q.
An example of how this method works is provided. To calculate the quotient of
11 (e.g., 1011 in binary format) divided by 3 (i.e., 0011 in binary format), first one must
expand 1011 to 000001011 and shift this number to the left. Then, 00001011x1 is obtained
using the left most l + m − 1 = 5 bits to subtract 0011. The result is 11110011x1. Now
the first bit is 1, so one would set x1 = 0 and shift left again. Then, the most 5 bits of
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Algorithm 13 Division(t, a)→ q
Require: Bit representation of t is t0, . . . , tl−1 and bit representation of a is a0, . . . , am−1
from the least to the most significant bits. Expand dividend t with m bits and set
ti = 0 where l ≤ i < l +m and expand another bit tl+m = 0 as sign bit of dividend.
1: for 1 ≤ i ≤ m:
(a) Shift left t for 1 bit
(b) if tl+m = 0 subtract tl+m−1 . . . tl with a
(c) else add tl+m−1 . . . tl with a
2: q ← tl−1 . . . t0
Algorithm 14 OP-PUC-Stage-3(ai, t
′, t′′, a′, a′′)→ δi
Require: S1 has a
′ and t′, S2 has a′′ and t′′, Pi has ai for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, N is public
1: S1 and S2:
(a) do Secure Division(t′, t′′, a′, a′′)→ (q′, q′′)
(b) Send q′ and q′′ to every power users
2: Ai:
(a) Calculate δi = ai ∗ (1− ta) and reduce at least δi power usages
11100110x2 are used to add 0011 since x1 = 0. The result is 11111110x2, and one would set
x2 = 0. One would then shift and add again for x2 = 0. This round results in 00010100x3,
x3 = 1 because 0 is the most significant bit. For next and last round, one must shift and
subtract. The final result is 00010001x4, x4 = 1. Thus, the quotient of this example is 3
(i.e., 0011 in binary format).
The presented garbled division circuit follows the basic rules of the “shift and sub-
tract” non-restoring method, and it is denoted by Secure Division(t′, t′′, a′, a′′) → (q′, q′′).
The inputs of the circuit are secret shares of t and a from S1 and S2. The outputs are
secret shares of q so that S1 and S2 cannot infer anything about a and t. In the end, every
power user will get q = q′ + q′′ mod N so as to compute δi using equation 1. Algorithm
14 summarizes the main steps of the third stage of the OP-PUC protocol.
6.1.5. Complexity Analysis. In this section both computation and communica-
tion complexities of the proposed OP-PUC protocol are analyzed. First, the computation
complexity for different sub-protocols is analyzed at each stage. At the first stage, each
user Ai and C perform the Secure Split protocol, which just has two addition operations.
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Servers S1 and S2 perform summations of n values, so the computation complexity of the
first stage is bounded by O(n) summations.
For the second stage, one must consider the secure comparison protocol. For the
garbled circuit approach, the inputs are two random shares with the size bounded by N ,
so O(logN) gates are needed in the initial phase of the garbled circuit to add the shares.
This step results in much smaller values than N , so the total number of gates for the
comparison circuit is bounded by O(logN).
Protocols for the two strategies become different at the third stage. For Strategy 1,
the maximum value among the n values needs to be found. This is achieved by a number
of secure comparison circuits. Thus, there are at least O(n logN) gates in the initial
stage. Since the numbers involved are much less than N , the total number of gates is
bounded by O(n logN). Each gate of the garbled circuit is encrypted by AES encryption.
Therefore, the computation complexity of Stage 2 and Stage 3 under Strategy 1 is bounded
by O(n logN) AES encryptions. The total computation complexity of OP-PUC under
Strategy 1 is bounded by O(n) summations plus O(n logN) AES encryptions.
Under Strategy 2 of Stage 3, the secure division circuit needs to be built and
evaluated. As before, the computation complexity of the initial stage is also bound by
O(logN). Since the bit lengths of the dividend and divisor are much less than N , the
computation complexity of the division circuit is also bound by O(logN). Each gate of
the garbled circuit is encrypted by AES encryption. Therefore, the computation complexity
of Stage 2 and Stage 3 is bounded by O(logN) AES encryptions. The total computation
complexity of OP-PUC under Strategy 2 is bounded by O(n) summations plus O(logN)
AES encryptions.
To analyze the communication complexity, one must know the size of the secret
shares. Since the value of each share is bounded by N , logN bits are needed to represent
each share. Thus, at the first stage, the total communication complexity is bounded by
O(n · logN) bits. Because the AES key size is a constant value, varying from 128 to 256,
the communication complexity for both Stage 2 and Stage 3 is bounded by O(logN) bits
and O(n · logN) bits under Strategy 1 and Strategy 2 respectively. Therefore, regardless
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the strategies, the total communication complexity of OP-PUC is bounded by O(n · logN)
bits.
6.1.6. Security Analysis. The security proof of the proposed protocols is straight-
forward. Only a high level discussion is provided here. In the second and third stages,
comparison and division of the garbled circuit, which is proved secure under the semi-
honest model [82], are used. Since all the intermediate outputs of these protocols are
random shares, based on the sequential composition theorem [84], the OP-PUC protocols
are also secure under the semi-honest model.
6.2. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section contains a discussion of the performance of the OP-PUC protocols
in detail under different parameter settings. Then, the computation costs of the existing
methods [14] are evaluated and compared with the proposed protocols.
In the OP-PUC protocols, each Ai and C only interact with the cloud servers for one
round: sending their inputs and receiving the final outputs. Between the two cloud servers,
S1 and S2, a garbled circuit can be evaluated in about two rounds of communication.
Therefore, regardless of different strategies and stages, the total number of interactions
between the two cloud servers is constant or just several rounds.
Since the communication complexity of the proposed protocol is very small, and the
communications between the individual users and the cloud servers at the first stage are
parallelizable, the communication complexity is ignored here. The computation complexity
is simulated on a Linux machine with an Intel R© Xeon R© Six-CoreTM CPU 3.07 GHz
processor and 12GB RAM running Ubuntu 12.04 LTS. Since the main part of the protocol
is based on the garbled circuits method, the protocol is implemented on top of a FastGC
[82], a Java-based framework that allows users to define Boolean circuits. After the circuits
are constructed, the framework encrypts the circuits, performs an oblivious transfer, and
evaluates the garbled/encrypted circuits. The size of inputs is fixed for cloud servers to a
1024-bit modulus. In these experiments, the values of ai’s and t are randomly generated
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such that a > t and 1 ≤ a, t ≤ 2m, where m is an upper bound bit length of the domain
size.
6.2.1. Performance of OP-PUC and OP-PUC2. Let OP-PUC2 denote the
proposed protocol based on the second strategy. The computation costs of different parties
involved in the OP-PUC protocol are first computed for n = 50 and varying values of m.
That is, the running time of cloud servers A and B (or S1 and S2) is analyzed for one
iteration (the same as the existing work). The costs of individual users and the power
company are not considered since almost all the computations are outsourced to the cloud
servers. As shown in Figure 6.1., the computation costs of A and B are 6.043 and 7.767
seconds, respectively, for m = 10. Although the computation times of A and B increase
with m, the portion of increase is very small in comparison with the expansion of the
domain size. For example, even when m = 50, the computation costs of A and B are
6.123 and 7.854 seconds, respectively, and they are pretty close to what they were when
m = 10. This is due to the inner structure of the maximum circuit: with the domain size
expanding, many new xor gates are plotted, which are free for evaluation, whereas the
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Figure 6.1. Complexity of OP PUC for n = 50
In a similar manner, the computation costs of A and B in the OP PUC2 protocol
are analyzed for varying values of m and with n = 50 and θ = 10, where θ is the bit
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length of a scalar factor. Note that the output of the division circuit is an integer, and a
and t might be very close, so a scalar factor is needed to come up with a more accurate
quotient. Therefore, the inputs of the division circuit are one m+ θ-bit dividend and one
m-bit divisor. The computation costs of different parties in OP PUC2 are shown in Figure
6.2.. As in OP PUC, the computation costs of individual users and the power company
are negligible and not counted. On the other hand, for m = 10, the computation costs of
A and B are 2.497 and 4.195 seconds, respectively. Similarly, the costs of A and B grow
slightly with the increase of m. For instance, the computation time of A is 2.688 seconds
when m = 50, and it is only increased by 0.191 seconds with a 40-bit size expansion.
The total computation costs of cloud providers A and B are now compared in
OP PUC (for one iteration) and OP PUC2 for m = 10 and varying values of n, where n
denotes the number of households from a given neighborhood. As shown in Figure 6.3.,
the total running time of OP PUC varies from 13.81 to 62.635 seconds when n is changed
from 50 to 250. On the other hand, the total running time of OP PUC2 remains nearly
constant at 6.692 seconds in average since t is independent of n. Following from Figure
6.3., it is clear that the total run time of OP PUC (even for one iteration) is always greater
than that of OP PUC2. According to the above analyses, that the proposed protocols are
very practical, especially for OP PUC2. Besides, there is nearly no computation cost for
the individual users and the utility company.
6.2.2. Performance Comparison with Existing Work. Finally, the compu-
tation costs of these protocols are compared with the existing work [14]. For n = 50 and
m = 10 (note that when m = 10, the domain size is 210 = 1024, which is already slightly
bigger than l = 1000 from the previous paper), the performance of OP PUC is close to
P-PUC∗1, which is roughly 13-15 seconds. The running time of OP PUC increases quickly
when number of households increases. However, according to the domain size, OP PUC
is more scalable: the running time is nearly stable (e.g., even when the domain size is
increased by a factor of 104, with the size of the neighborhood fixed to 50, the running
time of OP PUC increases just less than 1 second). Note that in P-PUC∗1, the execution
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Figure 6.3. Complexity: OP PUC Vs. OP PUC2
that when the domain size changes from 1024 to 4096, and the number of neighborhood
is fixed to 50 users, the running time of P-PUC∗1 increases from 11.02 seconds to 33.75
seconds. Also, OP PUC2 is more efficient and scalable than P-PUC∗2. For example, when
the domain size is 5000, OP PUC2 is faster than P-PUC∗2 by a factor of 3 to 4. Although
the problem definition of this work is different from the existing work, these protocols
achieve the same power usage control in a more efficient way.
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7. PRIVACY-PRESERVING POWER SUPPLY CONTROL
In this chapter, solutions for another situation – power shortage – is considered.
When the regional power demand is greater than power supply ability of the utility com-
pany, then a power shortage situation is going to happen. Interestingly, threshold power
usage control protocols can be applied for this situation, however, it needs the end users
to sign an agreement with utility company for smartly power control anywhere anytime.
If end users insist consuming much when regional power consumption level is high, the
utility company needs to buy additional power supplies from other energy sources to meet
the high demand.
1) Electricity Market
Just as other traditional commodities, electricity is also bought and re-sold many
times before being consumed. These transactions are composing the wholesale electricity
market. Anyone who obtaining necessary approvals, even without owning any generation
or serving any end-use customers, can participant the power market in buying and selling
powers [86]. An auction process can be used to decide the electricity price in which elec-
tricity suppliers place bids with an independent market administrator or a utility company
for a particular time period. The independent administrator then chooses the lowest bids
and tries to meet the electricity demand [87].
2) Second Price Auction
Here we consider an privacy-preserving auction process that helps the electricity market
administrator to choose the best price properly, without loss of bidders’ (or suppliers’)
privacy. Under our problem domain, we consider the price from each supplier is private
information. For one, it is in the best interest of the suppliers not to disclose their prices
publicly to lose competitive advantages. In addition, for the auction process to be per-
formed properly and fairly, the prices should not be disclosed to the buyers or the utility
company under our context. Specially, the auction is a sealed bid second price auction or
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Vickrey auction [88]. In this type of auction the lowest bider wins with paying the second
lowest bid. We choose this auction scheme because it has an important property that the
optimal strategy of bidders is to simply bid their true valuation of the goods [89, 90]. At
the same time, the sealed-bid second price auction requires less interaction and easier to
run automatically in a smart grid.
The auctioneer is normally treated as trusted party in an auction process. However,
this is not always true. A corrupt auctioneer may take advantage of bidders’ information.
To solve this problem, the value of each bid needs to be hidden from auctioneer. Let us
consider the ideal model: the auctioneer opens the auction and bidders take part in it.
Then there is a trusted third party help the auctioneer to decide which bidder wins, and
tell him to pay the second lowest bid. During this process, only who wins and the second
lowest price will be disclosed, nothing else will be learned by the auctioneer. This chapter
proposes a scheme that reaches a solution to this problem with two cloud servers, and do
not need a trusted third party.
7.1. PROBLEM DEFINITION FOR PRIVACY-PRESERVING POWER SUP-
PLY CONTROL: OP-PSC
Suppose there are n energy suppliers E1, . . . , En. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let ei denote the
price or bid under which Ei is willing to sell to the utility company. The proposed out-
sourceable privacy-preserving power usage control (OP-PSC) protocol can be formulated
as follows:
〈U, (E∗, e∗)〉 ← OP-PSC(〈Ei, ei〉1≤i≤n, S1, S2, U) (4)
According to the above formulation, there are three types of participating entities: n energy
companies or suppliers, two cloud service providers S1 and S2, and the utility company
U . The input for each supplier Ei is its bid price ei. The two cloud servers perform the
necessary computations, and there are no explicit inputs for the two servers. After the
execution of the OP-PSC protocol, the utility company knows who won the auction and
the price, and the utility company passes this information to the corresponding supplier.
The other participating entities do not receive any outputs.
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7.1.1. Threat Model. In the chapter, we adopt secure multiparty computation
(SMC) again. More specifically, we assume the participating entities are semi-honest; that
is, the entities follow the prescribed procedures of the protocol. Under the semi-honest
model, it is implicit that the participating entities do not collude. Another adversary
model of SMC is the malicious model. Under the malicious model, the entities can behave
arbitrarily. Most efficient SMC-protocols are secure under the semi-honest model since less
number of steps are needed to enforce honest behaviors. We have the following motivations
to adopt the semi-honest model:
• The OP-PSC protocol needs to be sufficiently efficient. Between the semi-honest
model and the malicious model, the semi-honest model always leads to much more
efficient protocol.
• The cloud service providers and the utility company are legitimate business. It is hard
to see they collude and initiate any malicious act to discover the private smart meter
readings. For well-known and reputable cloud servers (e.g., Amazon and Google), it
makes sense to assume they follow the protocol and behave semi-honestly.
7.1.2. Our Contribution. The contribution in this chapter is to develop a novel
OP-PSC protocol that allows a utility company to purchase additional power from other
energy companies in a privacy-preserving manner. The OP-PSC protocol is a secure im-
plementation of the second price auction model.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.2. provides implementation
details regarding the proposed OP-PSC protocol. Section 7.3. presents empirical results
to show the practicality of OP-PSC protocols.
7.2. THE PROPOSED OP-PSC PROTOCOL
In our problem domain, the utility company and n power suppliers E1,. . . ,En engage
in a second price sealed-bid process. After the utility company starts the process, each
power supplier Ei submits a bid ei for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, respectively, showing how much he wants
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Algorithm 15 OP-PSC(〈E1, e1〉, . . . , 〈En, en〉, S1, S2, U)→ 〈U, (E∗, e∗)〉
Require: pk is known to all parties and S2 has pr
1: Ei (1 ≤ i ≤ n):
(a) [ei]← Epk(e0i ), . . . , Epk(emi )
(b) Send 〈Ei, [ei]〉 to S1
2: S1 and S2:
(a) 〈S1, (Ej, ej)〉 ←SMINn(〈E1, [e1]〉, . . . , 〈En, [en]〉), where ej = min(e1, . . . , en)
(b) 〈S1, (E∗, e∗)〉 ←SMINn−1(〈E1, [e1]〉, . . . , 〈Ej−1, [ej−1]〉, 〈Ej+1, [ej+1]〉, . . . ,
〈En, [en]〉), where e∗ = min(e1, . . . , ej−1, ej+1, . . . , en)
3: S1: send 〈E∗, [e∗]〉 to U and E∗
for selling a unit power. After all, the power supplier that gave the lowest bid wins and
is paid by the second lowest price. Besides, we want the whole process secure, which is to
say, the utility company will only know the winner and the price he is going to be paid,
and the bidder will learn nothing about the others’ bids except that the winner learns
the second lowest price. Also, this protocol is build in an outsourced environment. Two
non-collude cloud servers S1 and S2 jointly perform the needed computations.
The detailed steps are given in Algorithm 15. In the first stage, the cloud servers
need to collect price information. We emphasize that during this process, the servers
should learn nothing about the price. To achieve this requirement, the server S2 firstly
publishes the homomorphic encryption public key pk [65], and each bidder Ei encrypts his
bidding price ei bit-wisely to get [ei] ← Epk(e0i ), . . . , Epk(emi ). Note that the bit length of
ei is bounded by m. Then Ei sends those encrypted values to S1.
In the next stage, S1 and S2 jointly decide who is the winner and the price he will
be paid. First, S1 and S2 engage in a secure minimum among n items protocol (SMINn)
introduced in [91] for the n encrypted prices and ID pairs 〈E1, e1〉, . . . , 〈En, en〉. The result
is that S1 learns the lowest price with its bidder ID 〈Ej, ej〉. Since those values are under
encrypted format, S1 only knows the lowest price. After that, S1 removes this tuple from
〈E1, e1〉, . . . , 〈En, en〉 and performs SMINn−1 jointly with S2 again for the remaining data
pairs. This time S1 will learn 〈E∗, e∗〉 which will be delivered to U .
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The complexity and security of OP-PSC is determined by the SMINn protocol.
Detailed complexity and security analyses can be found in [91].
7.3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the performance of the OP-PSC protocols in details
under different parameter settings. Since the communication complexity of the proposed
protocol is very small, and the communications between the individual users and the cloud
servers at the first stage are parallelizable. Here we ignore the communication complexity.
We simulate the computation complexity on a Linux machine with an Intel R© Xeon R© Six-
CoreTM CPU 3.07 GHz processor and 12GB RAM running Ubuntu 12.04 LTS. We im-
plement the protocol based on Pailliar’s additive homomorphic encryption scheme using
C and GMP library. We also fix the encryption key size of inputs for cloud servers to a
1024-bit. In our experiments, we randomly generate the values of inputs prices.
In the OP-PSC protocol, the main component and performance bottleneck is the
SMINn protocol, which will return the minimum value among n values, under encrypted
form. In all, the SMINn protocol that we adopted here will be executed twice and find the
minimum and second minimum values from the input group. We implement the protocol
using C and GMP library based on Pailier’s additive homomorphic encryption scheme [65].
We also follow the same rules as before: encryption key size is fixed to 1024 bit. The input
bid values are generated randomly.
In our experiments, we mainly compare the performance of S1 and S2, since the
computation overhead for other participating parties are negligible. In Figure 7.1., we fix
the number of bidders or suppliers n = 10 and compare the running time for various bit
length of domain size m from 10 to 50. The time linearly increases with the increasing of
bit length m. This is because in the protocol, the number of exponentiation functions that
needs to be performed is based on m. Figure 7.2. gives us another comparison between
S1 and S2 when m is fixed to 10 and n is varied. The range of n is between 10 and 50.
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Figure 7.2. Complexity of OP-PSC for m = 10
The trend is also linear-like since the sub-protocols of SMINn are composed of n − 1
times secure minimum between two values. Overall, the running time of the protocol is
acceptable: when the bit length of the domain size becomes 50, the total running time for
one cloud server is still less than 20 seconds.
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8. CONCLUSIONS
The smart grid system has been emerging as the next-generation’s intelligent power
system. In particular, the utility company in a smart grid environment can periodically
record the power usage of household to efficiently manage its power supply to the house-
holds in a neighborhood. The power consumption data is useful in preventing power outage
issues in the given neighborhood. However, due to the user’s privacy concerns, direct col-
lection of the user’s power consumption data by the utility company is not allowed at first
place. Along this direction, this dissertation proposes four novel and secure threshold-
based power usage control protocols using two strategies discussed in Section 1.1. as a
baseline.
At first, two efficient P-PUC protocols are proposed in Chapter 4.. However, since
the adopted building blocks are not fully secure, some information will be disclosed during
the execution of these protocols. Therefore, more secure and efficient protocols are pro-
posed in Chapter 5.. Efficient and novel solutions to the basic security primitives, namely
secure binary conversion, comparison, maximum, and division operations, are also con-
structed. We emphasize that these new sets of sub-protocols can also be used in other
secure multi-party computation (MPC) based applications, such as secure clustering and
classification. Furthermore, we have empirically shown the practical applicability of the
proposed protocols through various experimental results.
As the emerging of cloud computing with its various advantages, protocols which is
outsourceable to the cloud, are developed in Chapter 6. and 7.. On one hand, comparing
with the previous four solutions, the proposed protocols in Chapter 6. are more efficient
and as secure. On the other hand, one novel solution for power shortage is also proposed
in Chapter 7.. More importantly, the computation costs for the users and the utility
company are negligible. As a future research direction, we will develop OP-PUC and OP-
PSC protocols secure under the malicious model and utilize more than two cloud servers
to further improve the computation costs.
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If there are at least three cloud servers, all secure computations can be performed
on secure shares. Secret sharing based secure computations can be more efficient than the
garbled circuit. We will investigate if the efficient of the OP-PUC and OP-PSC proto-
cols can be improved under the secret sharing model. To develop OP-PUC and OP-PSC
protocols secure under the malicious model, we may adopt threshold homomorphic en-
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